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Internet Architecture and Disability 
BLAKE E. REID* 
The Internet is essential for education, employment, information, and cultural and 
democratic participation. For tens of millions of people with disabilities in the 
United States, barriers to accessing the Internet—including the visual presentation 
of information to people who are blind or visually impaired, the aural presentation 
of information to people who are deaf or hard of hearing, and the persistence of 
Internet technology, interfaces, and content without regard to prohibitive cognitive 
load for people with cognitive and intellectual disabilities—collectively pose one of 
the most significant civil rights issues of the information age. Yet disability law lacks 
a comprehensive theoretical approach for fully facilitating Internet accessibility. The 
prevailing doctrinal approach to Internet accessibility seeks to treat websites as 
metaphorical “places” subject to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), which requires places of public accommodations to be accessible to people 
with disabilities. While this place-centric approach to Title III has succeeded to a 
significant degree in making websites accessible over the last two decades, large 
swaths of the Internet—more broadly construed to include Internet technologies 
beyond websites—remain inaccessible to millions of people with a variety of 
disabilities. 
As limitations of a place-based approach to Title III become clearer, a new 
framework for disability law is needed in an increasingly intermediated Internet. 
Leveraging the Internet-law literature on perspectives, this article recognizes the 
place-centric approach to Title III as normatively and doctrinally “internal,” in the 
terminology of Internet-law scholars. It offers a framework for supplementing this 
internal approach with an external approach that contemplates the layered 
architecture of the Internet, including its constituent content, web and non-web 
applications, access networks operated by Internet service providers, and devices 
and the role of disability and other bodies of law, particularly including 
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telecommunications law and attendant policy issues, such as net neutrality, in 
making them accessible. 
INTRODUCTION 
The nearly fifty-million Americans who are deaf or hard of hearing, many of whom 
have speech disabilities, face limited outlets for real-time communication, a glut of 
Internet-delivered video programming with missing or poor-quality captions, and an 
increasingly large array of devices with inaccessible voice-operated interfaces.1 The 
more than seven million Americans who are blind or visually impaired have 
witnessed the revolution of web and mobile applications pass with inconsistent, 
broken, or missing support for screen readers and a dearth of video content with audio 
descriptions.2 The estimated two-and-a-half million to nearly twelve-million 
Americans with intellectual and cognitive disabilities routinely face complex user 
interfaces designed without considering cognitive load and a dearth of content 
delivered in plain language.3 And millions more have motor and physical disabilities 
that prevent them from interacting with a variety of Internet-enabled devices and 
applications, including the “smart” vehicles, homes, and clothing that constitute the 
“Internet of Things.” Making the Internet accessible to people with disabilities is one 
of the most pressing civil rights challenges of the twenty-first century, with unique 
and complex legal, technical, architectural, and political dimensions. 
More generally, the United Nations estimates that a billion people—fifteen 
percent of the world’s population—live with a disability, making people with 
disabilities “the world’s largest minority.”4 Yet the Internet—the gateway to the 
economic, social, cultural, and participatory fruits of the information age—has 
remained inaccessible,5 in a variety of ways, to this significant population.  
These are not trivial concerns of luxury or convenience. People with disabilities 
have faced historical barriers to societal institutions that are, in many cases, 
exacerbated by Internet-enabled technological disruptions that render social change 
without accessibility in mind. Access to the Internet is a primary driver of education, 
employment, civic participation, cultural engagement, and more. The denial of equal 
access to the Internet is tantamount to “second-class citizenship” and inhibits the 
social integration mandate of the ADA.6 The Internet likewise promises to serve the 
ADA’s integration mandate as much or more than any other technological 
 
 
 1. Frank R. Lin, John K. Niparko & Luigi Ferrucci, Hearing Loss Prevalence in the 
United States, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1851, 1851–52 (2011).  
 2. See Blindness Statistics, NAT’L FED’N OF THE BLIND, https://nfb.org/blindness 
-statistics [https://perma.cc/53TV-LN9N].  
 3. See THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. ENG’G MED., MENTAL DISORDERS AND DISABILITIES 
AMONG LOW-INCOME CHILDREN 267–79 (Thomas F. Boat & Joel T. Wu eds., 2015) (ebook). 
 4. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, Factsheet on Persons with Disabilities, UNITED 
NATIONS, https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/resources/factsheet-on-persons 
-with-disabilities.html [https://perma.cc/DE4A-WX8P]. 
 5. See PETER BLANCK, EQUALITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR WEB ACCESSIBILITY BY PERSONS 
WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES 45–49 (2014). 
 6. JONATHAN LAZAR, DANIEL GOLDSTEIN & ANNE TAYLOR, ENSURING DIGITAL 
ACCESSIBILITY THROUGH PROCESS AND POLICY 91 (2015). 
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development, and “promotes democratic engagement and human fulfillment by 
fostering understanding and communication among people with and without 
disabilities across the economic spectrum.”7 Against this backdrop, shortcomings in 
Internet accessibility threaten to deny millions of Americans access to the economic, 
educational, cultural, and democratic life of the twenty-first century.8 
This Article starts from the premise that full access9 to the Internet for people with 
disabilities10 is normatively important and that to achieve Internet accessibility for 
people with disabilities, “anti-discrimination measures and positive actions are 
sometimes needed.”11 While many anti-discrimination movements begin with a fight 
to overcome overt animus, the movement toward Internet accessibility has, from its 
inception, dealt more directly with questions of how to overcome omissive failures 
to incorporate accessibility into the design of technological systems by the 
proprietors, vendors, and users of Internet-enabled technology.12  
In other words, Internet accessibility is situated squarely in what Samuel 
Bagenstos has deemed in the context of employment law a “structural turn” in the 
broader movement to fight discrimination against people with disabilities.13 The 
questions Internet accessibility poses are not matters of preventing conscious animus 
toward people with disabilities, but matters of constructing and remediating 
 
 
 7. BLANCK, supra note 5, at 40, 44. 
 8. See Bradley Allan Areheart & Michael Ashley Stein, Integrating the Internet, 83 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 449, 452 (2015). 
 9. The term “equal access” is often used as well, though it elides that accessibility often 
entails customization tailored to the particular aspects of a person’s disability. 
 10. This Article uses “person-first” language—e.g., “people with disabilities” throughout 
primarily as a matter of consistency, and not as an intentional endorsement of person-first 
language over identity-first language—e.g., “disabled people.”—or an attempt to stake a 
position in the debate over the appropriate language to use. While I interact with many 
accessibility advocates in my clinical work who prefer “person-first” language, others prefer 
identity-first language. See, e.g., Lydia X. Z. Brown, The Significance of Semantics: Person-
First Language: Why It Matters (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.autistichoya.com/2011/08/ 
significance-of-semantics-person-first.html [https://perma.cc/KX6C-69PT] (arguing for the 
use of identity-first language). Also, this Article does not contend in depth with the debate 
over the scope of disabilities that should be swept into the right to equal access. See infra 
Section III.E. 
 11. BLANCK, supra note 5, at 45. 
 12. This is not to suggest that the accessibility requirements on the Internet have been or 
will be uncontroversial. For example, Eric Goldman has argued that applying the ADA to the 
Internet will “potentially rip[] open a huge hole in Internet law” and enable “jobless recent law 
school grads” to make “buckets of money . . . in ADA litigation against Internet companies.” 
Eric Goldman, Will the Americans With Disabilities Act Tear a Hole in Internet Law?, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 27, 2012, 9:30 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/will-the 
-americans-with-disabilities-act-tear-a-hole-in-internet-law/ [https://perma.cc/72LC-GRHE]. 
Though grappling with the treatment of disability issues by Internet law scholars is beyond the 
scope of this Article, some of the economic concerns that Goldman and others raise are 
addressed in the context of this Article’s discussion on undue economic burden. See supra 
Section III.C. 
 13. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing proposals for structural 
approaches to employment discrimination law). 
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architecture and content to make it accessible and usable; the answers are not merely 
barring discriminatory conduct, but identifying specifically who must do what, and 
when, and how, to ensure that people with disabilities can fully use the Internet. 
These questions and answers are no less important from the perspective of anti-
discrimination theory than those of animus,14 but they require a structural set of 
doctrinal accessibility mandates to fulfill the normative vision of 
antidiscrimination.15 
This Article aims to grapple, then, with the question of how, exactly, the goal of 
Internet accessibility can be achieved, and provide disability-law scholars and 
advocates with a lens for more comprehensively understanding that set of problems 
that “Internet accessibility,” broadly construed, should be concerned with solving.  
Part I of this Article observes that the use of Title III of the ADA as the wellspring 
for Internet accessibility has led to a prevailing doctrinal approach to Internet 
accessibility that is rooted in a place-centric conception of the civil rights of people 
with disabilities. This approach advocates treating the Internet as a metaphorical 
“place” subject to Title III of the ADA, which requires places of public 
accommodations to be accessible to people with disabilities.16 As a result, much of 
the attention to Internet accessibility is centered on Internet-enabled technology that 
is easily amenable to Title III’s “place” metaphor. The technology most amenable to 
that metaphor is the websites that comprise the World Wide Web (colloquially, “the 
web”), which users “visit” or “go to” using their computer’s web browser. In 
disability scholarship, Internet accessibility has become implicitly synonymous with 
web accessibility. 
Part II introduces the Internet-law literature of “perspectives” to Internet 
accessibility. Applying the perspectives literature reveals that the prevailing place- 
and website-centric approach to Title III is properly understood as what Internet-law 
scholars call an “internal” perspective, rooted in the user’s experience of the Internet. 
 
 
 14. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 826–27 (2003) (rejecting a “normative 
distinction between the [ADA]’s mandate to provide ‘reasonable accommodation’ to people 
with disabilities and the antidiscrimination requirements of the civil rights laws that emerged 
in the 1960s and 1970s”); see also Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn 
Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 206 (2010) 
(discussing “whether antidiscrimination law should be understood as driven by 
antisubordination as opposed to anticlassification values”).  
 15. Sarah Schindler has addressed issues of discrimination and exclusion in physical, built 
architecture. See Sarah B. Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation 
Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934 (2015). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012). Place-centrism is uncommon in disability laws outside 
of Title III of the ADA; Title I focuses on employment, 42 U.S.C. ch. 126, subch. I (2012); 
Title II focuses on state and local government services, 42 U.S.C. ch. 126, subch. II (2012); 
and Title IV focuses on telecommunications relay services, 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2012). Sections 
504 and 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1976, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, 794(d) (2012), and state 
laws such as California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2007) and 
Disabled Persons Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 54–55.2 (West 2007), have different substantive 
scopes that do not necessarily focus on places. Though a full exploration of these laws is 
beyond the scope of this article, these laws potentially play an important role in Internet 
accessibility. See infra Sections III.C, III.D, and III.E. 
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While I explain why such a perspective is both doctrinally and normatively justified, 
I also describe the shortcomings of the internal perspective as a framework for 
addressing Internet accessibility beyond the application of Title III to websites. By 
augmenting the internal perspective on Title III with a countervailing “external” 
perspective, I sketch a broader framework for addressing Internet accessibility 
informed not only by the experience of using the Internet, but by the Internet’s 
layered architecture. 
In Part III, I color in the external sketch by illustrating with examples what a more 
comprehensive realization of the goal of Internet accessibility would require. I first 
disentangle the application and content layers of both the web and the diverse array 
of modern Internet applications, including those delivered by dominant platform 
companies that host the content of their users. I close with a discussion of 
underexplored accessibility considerations specific to the Internet’s building 
blocks—the network and physical layers—and the class of devices that comprise the 
so-called “Internet of Things,” in which issues such as the accessibility dimensions 
of network neutrality and voice assistants arise. Throughout, I consider the role that 
other substantive bodies of law—in particular, telecommunications law—may play 
in facilitating a more comprehensive approach to Internet accessibility. 
I. TITLE III AND THE INTERNET: THE WEB AS THE INTERNET AND THE WEBSITE AS 
THE PLACE  
As a doctrinal matter, the conceptions of Title III as applied to the Internet most 
favorable to people with disabilities treat the Internet as the web and websites as 
places—as in Title III’s “places of public accommodation.” This is partially a result 
of the ADA’s inception in a pre-Internet society, where the goal of an accessible 
world necessarily took root in physical places. But it has also proved facile in the 
context of the Internet; Title III has the capacity to win accessibility cases primarily 
focused on websites, because websites are easy to understand as metaphorical places. 
This Part begins with a short history of Title III and its website- and place-centrism, 
and how it has driven disability-law scholars to theorize about the Internet as the 
Web and websites as places.  
Enacted in 1990, the ADA was intended as a comprehensive and unqualified civil 
rights remedy for discrimination against people with disabilities. The ADA’s 
preamble makes explicit that the purpose of the ADA is “to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”17 In signing it into law, President George H.W. Bush 
declared that the ADA “signal[ed] the end to the unjustified segregation and 
exclusion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life.”18  
 
 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012). 
 18. Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 933, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 601–02 (July 26, 1990). Compare Lawrence O. Gostin, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act at 25: The Highest Expression of American Values, 313 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 
2231, 2234 (2015) (lauding the role and breadth of the ADA in improving the state of equality 
for people with disabilities and influencing the development of international disability 
instruments), with Arlene S. Kanter, The Americans with Disabilities Act at 25 Years: Lessons 
to Learn from the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 819, 
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If the anti-discrimination goal of the ADA was broadly scoped, its implementation 
was drawn at least rhetorically with the physical, built world of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s in mind. Title III, the portion of the ADA intended to deal with the 
accessibility of private businesses, explicitly prohibits discrimination against people 
with disabilities in “any place of public accommodation.”19 Title III likewise defines 
public accommodations extensively in terms of places—places of lodging,20 places 
of exhibition or entertainment,21 places of public gathering,22 places of public display 
or collection,23 places of recreation,24 and places of exercise.25 Moreover, it illustrates 
them in terms of traditionally physical buildings—hotels and motels,26 restaurants 
and bars,27 theaters and concert halls,28 stores and shopping centers,29 laundromats 
and banks,30 museums and libraries,31 parks and zoos,32 daycare centers and homeless 
shelters,33 and gyms and bowling alleys.34 
Of course, the legislative history of the ADA makes clear that it was not intended 
to exclude future technology, noting that “the types of accommodation and services 
provided to individuals with disabilities, under all of the titles of [the ADA], should 
keep pace with the rapidly changing technology of the times.”35 But however 
Congress might have intended the ADA to apply to the Internet is obscured by the 
fact that the commercial Internet was essentially nonexistent when the ADA was 
signed into law in July of 1990.36 In fact, it was not until five months later that Tim 
Berners-Lee hosted the first website,37 five years later that the Federal Networking 
Council resolved to officially recognize “the Internet” in the form that it more or less 
 
 
819 (2015) (criticizing the ADA’s anti-discrimination approach and lauding the human rights 
approach of the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added); see also Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live 
in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841, 848, 850 (1966) 
(referring to “the right to live in the world” for people with disabilities). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). 
 21. Id. § 12181(7)(B). 
 22. Id. § 12181(7)(D). 
 23. Id. § 12181(7)(H). 
 24. Id. § 12181(7)(I). 
 25. Id. § 12181(7)(L). 
 26. Id. § 12181(7)(A). 
 27. Id. § 12181(7)(B). 
 28. Id. § 12181(7)(C). 
 29. Id. § 12181(7)(E). 
 30. Id. § 12181(7)(F). 
 31. Id. § 12181(7)(H). 
 32. Id. § 12181(7)(I). 
 33. Id. § 12181(7)(K). 
 34. Id. § 12181(7)(L). 
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 381 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
391. 
 36. E.g., LAZAR ET AL., supra note 6, at 89. 
 37. Frequently Asked Questions: Examples of Early WWW Hypertext: What Was the First 
Web Page?, https://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/FAQ.html#Examples [https://perma.cc 
/FXD5-G3UZ]. 
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exists today,38 and nearly ten years later than advocates and policymakers first began 
to debate the applicability of the ADA to the Internet.39 
A congressional hearing in 2000 previewed the two defining features of the 
emerging debate over the ADA’s applicability to the Internet. First, the debate would 
center specifically on the web and websites. The use of websites by private 
businesses predominated usage of the early Internet, and so the question of website 
accessibility appeared exhaustive of the question of Internet accessibility.40 Nearly 
every witness, whether in support of the ADA’s applicability or against, spoke of the 
Internet, the web, and websites interchangeably. 41  
Second, the debate would turn on whether the Internet could be conceived of as a 
physical “place” in the statute’s terms. Some witnesses argued that “[t]he Internet 
has become a place of public accommodation,”42 while others argued that 
“[c]yberspace isn’t a physical place” as contemplated by Title III’s list of “places.”43  
Nearly two decades of litigation have calcified these features of the debate. First, 
Internet accessibility under Title III has hinged on whether websites can be properly 
conceived as places of public accommodation even though they do not occupy a 
physical space.44 Nearly all Title III Internet-related litigation has been focused on 
websites, and primarily on compatibility with screen readers for blind people.45 
As to the second, even before the Internet became a concern, the federal courts 
had split over whether Title III was limited to physical places. The leading set of 
cases split over whether the content of insurance policies, and not simply the physical 
structure of insurance company offices, were covered by Title III.46 
 
 
 38. BARRY M. LEINER, VINTON G. CERF, DAVID D. CLARK, ROBERT E. KAHN, LEONARD 
KLEINROCK, DANIEL C. LYNCH, JON POSTEL, LARRY G. ROBERTS & STEPHEN WOLFF, BRIEF 
HISTORY OF THE INTERNET 17 (1997), https://www.Internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2017/09/ISOC-History-of-the-Internet_1997.pdf [https://perma.cc/N72G-3BZT].  
 39. See  BLANCK, supra note 5, at 81–82 (discussing the early days of the debate over the 
ADA’s applicability to the Internet in the late 1990s and early 2000s). 
 40. See Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to Private Internet 
Sites: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Cong. 1–2 (2000) (testimony of Chairman Charles Canady) (referring interchangeably 
to “greater handicapped accessibility of the Web,” the applicability of the ADA to “private 
Internet Web sites,” and “the impact of the ADA on the Internet”); id. at 6 (testimony of Gary 
Wunder) (“[L]et’s lower [the bar for accessibility] for Web sites and the Internet.”); id. at 19, 
21 (testimony of Judy Brewer) (framing the hearing in terms of “Web accessibility” and 
referring interchangeably to the “Web industry” and the “Internet industry”); id. at 25 
(testimony of Susyn Conway) (referring interchangeably to the “World Wide Web” and the 
“Internet”). 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 10 (Testimony of Dr. Steven Lucas). 
 43. Id. at 38 (Testimony of Elizabeth K. Dorminey). 
 44. See, e.g., BLANCK, supra note 5, at 82; LAZAR ET AL., supra note 6, at 89. 
 45. See infra notes 47–51 and accompanying text. 
 46. Compare Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins., 198 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1999) (subsequent 
history omitted) (extending Title III to insurance policies sold in insurance offices and noting 
that Title III “was meant to guarantee them more than mere physical access”), and Carparts 
Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994) (extending 
Title III to the administration of a health benefit plan and noting that Title III “make[s no] 
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That split has continued into the era of Title III Internet litigation along three lines: 
1. Nexus-Between-Website-and-Place: One line of cases, followed by 
courts in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, concludes that websites alone 
are not public accommodations but can be the subject of a Title III claim 
to the extent they have a sufficient nexus to a physical place of public 




mention of physical boundaries or physical entry”), with McNeil v. Time Ins., 205 F.3d 179, 
186 (5th Cir. 2000) (same), Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 
(9th Cir. 2000) (same), Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612–13 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(declining to extend Title III to an insurance policy as a “place” even though insurance offices 
are covered under Title III), and Parker v. Metro. Life Ins., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 
1997) (same). See also Torres v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1038 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001) (declining to extend Title III to AT&T’s digital cable service); Doe v. Mut. of 
Omaha Ins., 179 F.3d 557, 558–59 (7th Cir. 1999) (declining to apply Title III to the content 
of an insurance policy but recognizing in dicta that Title III extends to public accommodations 
“whether in physical space or in electronic space”) (citing Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19); 
Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995) (declining to 
extend Title III to the televised broadcast of football games). 
 47. E.g., Gomez v. Bang & Olufsen Am., Inc., No. 1:16-CV-23801-LENARD, 2017 WL 
1957182, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2017) (“[A] website that is wholly unconnected to a physical 
location is generally not a place of public accommodation under [Title III],” but “if a plaintiff 
alleges that a website’s inaccessibility impedes the plaintiff’s ‘access to a specific, physical, 
concrete space[,]’ and establishes some nexus between the website and the physical place of 
public accommodation, the plaintiff’s ADA claim can survive a motion to dismiss.”). Compare 
Earll v. eBay, Inc., 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that eBay’s website 
was not connected to any “actual physical place” and thus not subject to Title III) (quoting 
Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114)), Jancik v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, No. SACV 13-1387-
DOC (RNBx), 2014 WL 1920751, at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (rejecting that Redbox’s 
instant video delivery website was sufficiently integrated with its physical kiosks to support a 
Title III claim), Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(concluding that Netflix’s website was not an “actual physical place” and therefore not a place 
under Title III) (quoting Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114)), Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 
1110, 1115–16 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting that the sale of gift cards at retail outlets formed a 
sufficient nexus to treat the Facebook’s website as a “place” under Title III), Ouellette v. 
Viacom, No. CV 10-133-M-DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 1882780, at *1, *4–5 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 
2011) (concluding that various websites including Google, YouTube, and Myspace lacked a 
sufficient nexus to a physical location to support a Title III claim), and Access Now, Inc. v. 
Sw. Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (rejecting that Southwest 
Airlines’ website had a sufficient connection with a physical location to be a place of public 
accommodation under Title III), aff’d on other grounds, 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004), with 
Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
122 (2019) (concluding that Domino’s Pizza’s website had a sufficient nexus to brick-and-
mortar Domino’s Pizza franchises to support the place element of a Title III claim), Gorecki 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. CV 17-1131-JFW(SKx), 2017 WL 2957736, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. June 15, 2017) (recognizing a sufficient nexus between Hobby Lobby’s website and stores 
to sustain a Title III claim), Gil v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1321 (S.D. 
Fla. 2017) (concluding that Winn-Dixie’s website had a sufficient nexus to its physical grocery 
stores to uphold a Title III claim), and Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 
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2. Standalone-Websites-as-Place: A second line of cases, followed by 
courts in the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits, concludes that even 
standalone websites can comfortably be considered places of public 
accommodation under Title III.48 The common thread of reasoning in 
these cases is that websites can be “analogous to a brick-and-mortar store 
or other venue that provides similar services.”49 
 
3. Physical Places Only (No Websites): A third line of cases, followed in 
the Third Circuit, concludes that websites cannot be treated as public 
accommodations even with a nexus to a physical place of public 
accommodation.50 




2d 946, 954–55 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (accepting a Title III claim against Target’s website, which 
the court deemed “heavily integrated with [Target’s] brick-and-mortar stores and operat[ing] 
in many ways as a gateway to the stores”); compare Stern v. Sony Corp. of Am., 459 F. App’x 
609, 610 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a sufficient connection between the accessibility of Sony’s 
video games with its video game conventions and retail stores), with Rendon v. Valleycrest 
Prods., 294 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002) (upholding a Title III challenge to an off-site 
screening process for a game show). 
 48. E.g., Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the 
argument that a Title III public accommodation must “literally . . . denot[e] a physical site, 
such as a store or a hotel”); Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-CV-116-JL, 2017 
WL 5186354, at *4 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017) (concluding that Blue Apron, the meal ingredient 
delivery service, is a place of public accommodation as a sort of “online ‘grocery store’”); 
Markett v. Five Guys Enters. LLC, No. 17-CV-788 (KBF), 2017 WL 5054568, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2017) (holding that Five Guys’ website was its own place of public 
accommodation in addition to being closely related to Five Guys’ brick-and-mortar hamburger 
restaurants); Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 385, 387 (E.D.N.Y. 
2017) (holding that a website for the sale of art supplies was a “place” under Title III); Nat’l 
Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 573 (D. Vt. 2015) (rejecting “that only 
physical places open to the public can be public accommodations”); Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf 
v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19) 
(noting that the application of Title III “as applying to web-based businesses is supported by 
[Carparts], which held that ‘places of public accommodation’ are not limited to ‘actual 
physical structures’”). 
 49. See Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200. 
 50. E.g., Anderson v. Macy’s Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00556, 2012 WL 3155717, at *4 (W.D. 
Pa. Aug. 2, 2012) (rejecting a Title III claim against Macy’s website notwithstanding a 
connection to Macy’s retail stores); see also Peoples v. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc., 387 F. 
App’x 179, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a Title III claim regarding customer support for 
a credit card used to purchase in-person prostitution services); cf. Noah v. AOL Time Warner 
Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 544 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d, No. 03-1770, 2004 WL 602711, at *1 
(4th Cir. Mar. 25, 2004) (declining to treat AOL chat rooms as places of public accommodation 
under Title II of the Civil Rights Act). 
 51. See LAZAR ET AL., supra note 6, at 91 (“If the law has remained cloudy, it is in part 
because entities who might argue the degree to which they are subject to Title III have chosen 
instead to reach settlement agreements to make their web sites and services accessible.”); id. 
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Advocates and scholars have also become increasingly concerned with the 
perspective of the Department of Justice (DOJ),52 which is charged with 
administering regulations for the implementation of Title III53 and routinely files 
amicus briefs and negotiates settlements in website accessibility cases.54 While 
DOJ’s view on the applicability of Title III to standalone websites has been 
historically supportive,55 a 2010 DOJ rulemaking to implement Title III website 
 
 
at 92 (noting Title III settlements with H&R Block, Peapod, eBay, Monster.com, Amazon, 
Ticketmaster, Travelocity, Wellpoint, and Charles Schwab); Lainey Feingold, Settlements in 
Structured Negotiation, LFLEGAL.COM, https://www.lflegal.com/negotiations/ [https://perma. 
cc/MB5H-6ATR] (listing dozens of website settlements from 1999–2018); see also Michael 
Ashley Stein, Michael E. Waterstone & David B. Wilkins, Cause Lawyering for People with 
Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1682 (2010) (noting that successful disability law 
outcomes, such as the Target litigation, often involve a sophisticated team of firms and 
attorneys dedicated to nuanced disability cause lawyering with an understanding of the value 
of settlements); Michael E. Waterstone, Michael Ashley Stein & David B. Wilkins, Disability 
Cause Lawyers, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1287, 1321 (2012) (noting that forcing settlements 
in web accessibility cases is often preferable because of the risk of an adverse ruling by the 
Supreme Court); Minh N. Vu, Kristina M. Launey, Susan Ryan & Kevin Fritz, Website Access 
and Other ADA Title III Lawsuits Hit Record Numbers, SEYFARTH SHAW: ADA TITLE III NEWS 
& INSIGHTS (July 17, 2018), https://www.adatitleiii.com/2018/07/website-access-and-other 
-ada-title-iii-lawsuits-hit-record-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/3P8F-RSCS] (projecting 
approximately 10,000 Title III website cases would be filed in 2018). For example, the first 
Title III web case was filed against America Online by the National Federation of the Blind in 
1999, but settled in 2000 without a judicial determination. See BLANCK, supra note 7, at 81; 
Wired Staff, AOL Settles Accessibility Suit, WIRED: BUSINESS (July 28, 2000, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2000/07/aol-settles-accessibility-suit/ [https://perma.cc/N9VA-
XC2G]. This trend continues today. E.g., ACB, et al. v. Hulu LLC, DISABILITY RIGHTS 
ADVOCS., https://dralegal.org/case/acb-et-al-v-hulu-llc/ [https://perma.cc/T57L-ZRBK] 
(describing the settlement of Title III claims against Hulu); Amazon.com, Inc. Agree to Expand 
Closed Captions on Amazon Video, NAT’L ASS’N DEAF, https://www.nad.org/2015/10/14 
/amazon-com-inc-agree-to-expand-closed-captions-on-amazon-video/ [https://perma.cc 
/QY3C-LBSC] (describing a settlement between Amazon and the National Association of the 
Deaf). One leading civil rights attorney has formally articulated a dispute resolution 
methodology specifically aimed at facilitating settlements in website and other cases. See 
generally LAINEY FEINGOLD, STRUCTURED NEGOTIATION (2016). But see Richard A. Posner, 
The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 762 (1975) (citing William M. Landes, 
An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971)) (suggesting that the 
frequency of litigation should increase, not decrease, in the face of uncertainty). 
 52. E.g., BLANCK, supra note 5, at 145–47; LAZAR ET AL., supra note 6, at 89. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2012). 
 54. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., ADA Enforcement: Title III, ADA.GOV, 
https://www.ada.gov/enforce_current.htm#TitleIII [https://perma.cc/B2E3-TB62] (listing the 
DOJ’s numerous interventions in Title III cases); see also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Restoring 
the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 241, 274 nn.151–
52 (2008) (describing DOJ’s settlement practices). 
 55. A 1996 letter from Assistant Attorney General Deval Patrick suggested that at least 
some websites could be covered under Title III. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant 
Attorney Gen., to Senator Tom Harkin (Sept. 9, 1996), https://www.justice.gov/crt/foia 
/readingroom/frequent_requests/ada_tal/tal712.txt [https://perma.cc/7QX7-KCV6]. In 2010, 
DOJ issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2010 on web accessibility 
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regulations languished56 and then was formally withdrawn in 2017 by then-Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions.57 
As a result, much of the disability law literature on Internet accessibility has been 
dedicated to narrow arguments debating the doctrinal contours of Title III’s 
applicability to websites in place-centric terms.58 Many of the articles and notes 
advocate for resolving the circuit split by treating standalone websites as “places” 
 
 
specifically endorsing several of the nexus cases and implying endorsement of the 
applicability of Title III to standalone websites. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; 
Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities and 
Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,460, 43,463–64 (July 26, 2010) (noting that Title 
III’s “broad and expansive nondiscrimination mandate reaches goods and services provided 
by covered entities on Web sites over the Internet” and noting its “repeate[d] affirm[ation of] 
the application of title III to Web sites of public accommodations”). DOJ has also filed 
statements of interest in Title III website cases. E.g., Statement of Interest of the United States 
of America in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 4–12, Nat’l 
Ass’n Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-30168 (D. Mass. May 15, 2012), https://www.ada.gov 
/briefs/netflix_SOI.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KMN-2MYG] (arguing that Netflix’s website is 
subject to Title III). 
 56. In 2017, the administration placed the web rulemaking on its inactive list. Office of 
Info. & Reg. Affairs, Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, REGINFO.GOV, 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/InactiveRINs_2017_Agenda_Update.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UN8B-6Q6J]. 
 57. Department of Justice: Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 83 Fed. Reg. 1890, 1890–91 
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-01-12/pdf/2017-28223.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D2Z2-CNXJ]. DOJ explained the withdrawal without addressing the 
substance of the split in a vague letter to Representative Ted Budd. Letter from Stephen E. 
Boyd, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Rep. Ted Budd (Sep. 25, 2018), https://www.adatitleiii.com 
/wp-content/uploads/sites/121/2018/10/DOJ-letter-to-congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LDZ-
RZ2H]. 
 58. See Areheart & Stein, supra note 8, at 453 n.23 (noting that the pre-2015 “legal 
scholarship to address this issue consists of student notes that invoke valuable doctrine, but 
are in want of normative grounding or of broader implication”).  
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under Title III,59 though some have argued in favor of either requiring a nexus from 
a website to a physical location60 or limiting Title III’s application to physical sites.61 
While few scholars have made a broader normative case for applying the ADA to 
the Internet,62 some recent scholarship has sought to articulate a theory for Internet 
accessibility rooted in terms of civil and human rights, including the UN Convention 
 
 
 59. E.g., Burgdorf, supra note 54, at 285–86 (arguing that standalone websites should be 
covered); Carrie L. Kiedrowski, The Applicability of the ADA to Private Internet Web Sites, 
49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 719, 723 (2001) (same); Jeffrey Scott Ranen, Was Blind but Now I See: 
The Argument for ADA Applicability to the Internet, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 389, 391–92 
(2002) (same); Adam M. Schloss, Web-Sight for Visually-Disabled People: Does Title III of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act Apply to Internet Websites?, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 35, 49–50 (2001) (same); see also Colin Crawford, Cyberplace: Defining a Right to 
Internet Access Through Public Accommodation Law, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 225, 234 (2003) 
(criticizing “highly location-bound conceptions of public accommodation law” as “both 
wrong-headed and out of step with the historical development and purposes of public 
accommodation law.”); Senator Tom Harkin, The Americans with Disabilities Act Ten Years 
Later: A Framework for the Future, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1575, 1578–79 (2000) (suggesting a 
broad application of the ADA to the web); Matthew A. Stowe, Interpreting “Place of Public 
Accommodation” Under Title III of the ADA: A Technical Determination with Potentially 
Broad Civil Rights Implications, 50 DUKE L.J. 297, 326–27 (2000) (lauding the Doe court’s 
decision to “tak[e] the emphasis off the physicality of ‘places of public accommodation”); 
Tara E. Thompson, Locating Discrimination: Interactive Web Sites as Public 
Accommodations Under Title II of the Civil Rights Act, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 409 (2002). 
 60. E.g., Michael Goldfarb, Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co.—Using the 
“Nexus” Approach to Determine Whether a Website Should be Governed by the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2005) (arguing for applying the nexus 
approach); Richard E. Moberly, The Americans with Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying 
the “Nexus” Approach to Private Internet Websites, 55 MERCER L. REV. 963, 978–79 (2004) 
(same); see also Michael P. Anderson, Ensuring Equal Access to the Internet for the Elderly: 
The Need to Amend Title III of the ADA, 19 ELDER L.J. 159, 181 (2011) (acknowledging the 
nexus test but recommending amending the ADA to broaden Title III’s reach); Jonathan Bick, 
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 205, 225 (2000) 
(discussing the possibility of the nexus test); see also Samuel H. Ruddy, Websites, Apps, 
Accessibility, and Extraterritoriality Under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
108 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 80, 101–02 (2019) (arguing that the nexus requirement should also 
apply to the data centers in which websites are hosted to address extraterritoriality 
considerations). 
 61. E.g., Ali Abrar & Kerry J. Dingle, From Madness to Method: The Americans with 
Disabilities Act Meets the Internet, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 136 (2009) (suggesting 
rejecting the nexus test in favor of a text-based vs. “media-rich” content test); Michael O. 
Finnigan, Jr., Brian C. Griffith & Heather M. Lutz, Accommodating Cyberspace: Application 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Internet, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1795, 1825 (2007) 
(arguing that Title III should apply only to physical places); Goldman, supra note 12; Paul 
Taylor, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 51 
(2001) (suggesting “carefully addressing the potential pitfalls” of applying Title III to 
website). 
 62. Areheart & Stein, supra note 8, at 453 n.23; see also Michael Waterstone, The Untold 
Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1811–12 
(2005) (noting that the majority of “high-profile” disability scholarship is focused on Title I 
of the ADA).  
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on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)63 and First Amendment values of 
freedom of information, democratic self-governance, personal autonomy, and self-
expression.64 But that theory, too, has expressly equated Internet accessibility with 
website accessibility.65 Bradley Areheart and Michael Stein specifically declare in 
Integrating the Internet that their version of “‘Internet accessibility’ . . . is principally 
concerned with the opportunity to traverse and navigate the Internet, which means 
mediating and utilizing the Internet’s constituent websites.”66 Victoria Ekstrand 
acknowledges the importance of Internet accessibility in other contexts, such as 
devices and networks, but declares the proliferation of cases under Title III warrants 
a specific focus on websites.67 Peter Blanck likewise speaks primarily to the 
importance of making “web content” accessible.68 
Likewise, recent Internet accessibility scholarship has advocated for web 
accessibility in explicitly place-centric terms, even beyond those imposed by Title 
III itself. Areheart and Stein argue in Integrating the Internet that the ADA should 
be interpreted broadly to cover the Internet by channeling disability pioneer Jacobus 
tenBroek’s seminal (and pre-ADA) right “to live in the world” to a right to “live in 
the Internet.”69 Areheart and Stein argue that “[f]or a growing number of people, the 
Internet is their world—a place where one can do nearly everything one needs or 
wants to do.”70 Ekstrand argues that “the Internet serves as another important place 
of public accommodation for disabled citizens,” citing the Supreme Court’s holding 
 
 
 63. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 21, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 
U.N.T.S. 44910 (requiring member states to “take all appropriate measures to ensure that 
persons with disabilities can exercise the right to freedom of expression and opinion, including 
the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas on an equal basis with others 
and through all forms of communication of their choice,” including “urging private entities” 
and “encouraging the mass media” to make their information and services accessible, 
“including through the Internet”). 
 64. See BLANCK, supra note 7, at 33–45 (casting Internet accessibility in terms of human 
rights, freedom to information, and the democratic values of the First Amendment); Areheart 
& Stein, supra note 8, at 476 (casting Internet accessibility as a normative function of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the First Amendment values of democratic self-governance, personal 
autonomy, and self-expression); Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Democratic Governance, Self-
Fulfillment and Disability: Web Accessibility Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and 
the First Amendment, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 427, 430 (2017). But cf. Gottfried v. FCC, 655 
F.2d 297, 311 n.54, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d in part sub nom. Cmty. Television v. Gottfried, 
459 U.S. 498 (1983) (rejecting the notion that the First Amendment affirmatively required 
television stations to include closed captions with their broadcasts). 
 65. But cf. Joshua Newton, Virtually Enabled: How Title III of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Might Be Applied to Online Virtual Worlds, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 183 (2010) 
(arguing for the application of Title III to non-web virtual worlds). 
 66. Areheart & Stein, supra note 8, at 452 n.20 (emphasis added). 
 67. Ekstrand, supra note 64, at 430. 
 68. BLANCK, supra note 5, at 14–15. 
 69. Areheart & Stein, supra note 8, at 456–57 (citing tenBroek, supra note 19, at 843, 
847–48). 
 70. Id. at 456, 458 (emphasis added) (criticizing the “digital architectural barriers [that] 
are springing up every day to undermine Title III’s normative social integration mandate.”). 
But see Burgdorf, supra note 54, at 284–85 (“From my perspective, the overemphasis on 
‘place’ in Title III [web cases] is misplaced.”). 
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in Packingham v. North Carolina that websites are “the principal sources for . . . 
speaking and listening in the modern public square.”71 Blanck similarly points to the 
Supreme Court’s description of the web as a “sprawling mall offering goods and 
services” in Reno v. ACLU as an “encouraging” metaphor for resolving Title III’s 
applicability to websites.72 
Both litigation and academic efforts to address Internet accessibility have 
consistently cast the web as a proxy for the Internet and conceptualized websites as 
places under the meaning of Title III. In the next Part, I position Title III in the 
context of Internet law’s internal/external perspectives literature to unpack the 
consequences of disability advocates’ and scholars’ place- and website-centric 
approach. 
II. INTERNAL/EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNET ACCESSIBILITY: WEBSITE-
CENTRISM VS. LAYER-CONSCIOUSNESS  
The metaphysical place-ness of websites, driven by the website-centricity of 
prevailing approaches to Title III, has emerged as perhaps the most critical question 
of the ADA’s applicability to the Internet. However, the question of place is not a 
novel one to Internet-law scholars, who routinely confront similar questions in a 
variety of bodies of law. Internet-law scholars have framed questions of the Internet’s 
place-ness in terms of internal and external perspectives. 
In this Part, I begin by introducing the perspectives literature and explaining why 
the prevailing place- and website-centric approach to Title III is properly understood 
as an internal perspective—and why such a perspective is both doctrinally and 
normatively justified. I turn, however, to considering what an internal perspective on 
Internet accessibility leaves out—namely, a framework for addressing Internet 
accessibility beyond websites—and use the external perspective to flesh out a 
broader framework for addressing Internet accessibility with a broader conception of 
the Internet’s layered architecture. 
A. Title III’s Place- and Website-Centricity as an Internal Perspective 
As Tim Wu notes, “[l]egal thinkers, no strangers to metaphor, took immediately 
to the idea of Cyberspace as a place” when beginning to confront Internet-law 
problems in the late 1990s and early 2000s.73 Julie Cohen explains that, as a result, 
Internet-law scholars have engaged in a “full-blown debate about the merits of 
cyberspatial reasoning and rhetoric.”74 
 
 
 71. Ekstrand, supra note 64, at 435–36 (quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. 
Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017)). 
 72. BLANCK, supra note 5, at 84 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997)) 
(emphasis added) (“The Web is thus comparable, from the readers’ viewpoint, to both a vast 
library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall 
offering goods and services.”). 
 73. Timothy Wu, When Law & the Internet First Met, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 171, 171 (2000). 
 74. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 211 (2007). 
Compare Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 439, 446–47 (2003) (“I think of cyberspace as a place. It may be virtual and 
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Orin Kerr has framed questions of “whether we look to physical reality or virtual 
reality for guidance” as the problem of perspective.75 These questions arise in the 
context of examples in computer crime and the Fourth Amendment,76 the governance 
 
 
abstract, but I conceive of it as a place nonetheless. Let me be bolder: though you may have 
never consciously thought about the proposition, you also conceive of cyberspace as a place. 
Let me go further and suggest that all legislators, judges, and lawyers unconsciously think that 
cyberspace is a place, even though at times they may argue vehemently that it is not.”), and 
Kevin Werbach, The Song Remains the Same: What Cyberlaw Might Teach the Next Internet 
Economy, 69 FLA. L. REV. 887, 945–46 (2017) (criticizing the dichotomy between virtual and 
physical interactions), with Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 
523 (2003) (“As a technical matter, of course, the idea that the Internet is literally a place in 
which people travel is not only wrong but faintly ludicrous. No one is ‘in’ cyberspace. The 
Internet is merely a simple computer protocol, a piece of code that permits computer users to 
transmit data between their computers using existing communications networks.”), and 
Jacqueline D. Lipton, Law of the Intermediated Information Exchange, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 
1342 (2012) (“[A]ll online conduct involves information exchange as opposed to physical 
contact”). See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 83–119 (2006) (grappling 
broadly with questions of the nature of “cyberspace”); MOBILE TECHNOLOGY AND PLACE 3–
25 (Rowan Wilken & Gerard Goggin eds., 2012) (discussing the concept of place in the 
context of media studies). 
 75. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357 
(2003); see also Stephanie A. Gore, “A Rose by Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors 
for New Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 403, 416 (2003); Lyria Bennett Moses, 
Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up with Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 255–56 (2007). 
 76. E.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 875–76 (2004); Orin S. Kerr, 
Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse 
Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1619–20 (2003); Kerr, supra note 75, at 364–71; Deirdre K. 
Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1571–72 (2004); 
see also F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crimes, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 293, 296 
(2005). 
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of virtual worlds77 and virtual reality,78 the law of robotics,79 intellectual property 
law,80 privacy law,81 and even Internet taxation law.82 
Kerr’s critical insight, which has framed much of this debate, is to divide 
perspectives of the Internet into a dichotomy of internal and external perspectives.83 
The internal perspective “adopts the point of view of a user who is logged on to the 
Internet and chooses to accept the virtual world of cyberspace as a legitimate 
construct,” while the external perspective “adopts the viewpoint of an outsider 
concerned with the functioning of the network in the physical world rather than the 
perceptions of a user.”84 From the internal perspective, “a computer connected to the 
Internet provides a window to a virtual world that is roughly analogous to the 
physical world of real space.”85 From the external perspective: 
[T]he Internet is simply a network of computers located around the world 
and connected by wires and cables. The hardware sends, stores, and 
receives communications using a series of common protocols. 
Keyboards provide sources of input to the network, and monitors provide 
destinations for output. When the Internet runs properly, trillions of zeros 
and ones zip around the world, sending and receiving communications 
that the computers connected to the network can translate into 
commands, text, sound, and pictures.86 
Kerr concludes that the choice between the internal and external perspectives is often 
outcome-determinative when we apply the law to a scenario on the Internet.87 That 
is, choosing to evaluate a situation from a user’s perspective may lead to different 
 
 
 77. E.g., F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1, 12 (2004); Nicolas Suzor, The Role of the Rule of Law in Virtual Communities, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1817, 1842 (2010); Gilad Yadin, Virtual Reality Surveillance, 35 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 707, 732–38 (2017). 
 78. E.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented 
Reality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1080–81 (2018); Gilad Yadin, Virtual Reality 
Exceptionalism, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 839, 874 (2018); Gilad Yadin, Virtual Reality 
Intrusion, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 63, 99 (2016). 
 79. E.g., Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 545 
(2015). 
 80. E.g., Candidus Dougherty & Greg Lastowka, Virtual Trademarks, 24 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 749, 814–15 (2008). 
 81. E.g., Ryan Calo, Robots as Legal Metaphors, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 209, 213–14 
(2016); M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1161 (2011); 
Jonathon W. Penney, Privacy and the New Virtualism, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 194, 229–30 
(2008). 
 82. Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 44 (2007). 
 83. Kerr, supra note 75, at 359–60. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 360 (footnotes omitted).  
 87. Id. at 362. 
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legal results than evaluating the same situation from a perspective that views the  
Internet literally in terms of its constituent computers, wires, and so forth.88 
While the debate has never been firmly resolved by Internet-law scholars, the 
prevailing approaches of disability advocates and scholars to Internet accessibility 
have a plainly internal perspective on the Internet. The reason for the embrace of the 
internal perspective by pro-accessibility advocates and scholars is driven in part by 
Title III doctrine, where, consistent with Kerr’s thesis, perspective is outcome-
determinative. Indeed, the sides of the circuit split on Title III website cases discussed 
in the previous Part fit neatly into the internal/external dichotomy. The cases where 
courts are willing to recognize standalone websites as places of public 
accommodation necessarily invoke an internal perspective, giving primacy to the 
user’s experience of the website as a metaphysical “place” subject to Title III’s 
requirements.89 Conversely, the cases that require a nexus between a website and a 
physical place to invoke Title III, as well as those cases that reject entirely the notion 
that a website can be subject to Title III, necessarily invoke an external perspective, 
giving primacy to the fact that a website is not literally a physical place and 
considering it under the law only to the extent it is directly tied to a physical place, 
or not at all.90 
In this light, disability law advocates and scholars are justified in taking an 
internal, place-centric perspective at least because it has yielded positive results in 
cases involving standalone websites. That is, Title III’s scope—places of public 
accommodation—has created path determinacy, effectively requiring advocates to 
adopt an internal, place-centric perspective to win website accessibility cases. 
Disability scholars also raise compelling normative reasons for adopting an 
internal, place-centric perspective on Internet accessibility. Areheart and Stein’s 
“right to live in the Internet” is inherently personal and focused on the lived 
experience of people with disabilities.91 How the Internet works, mechanically or 
physically speaking, is much less important than the fact that websites are an 
“indispensable part of day-to-day life in the modern world” through which a person 
conducts all their “[c]ore life activities such as commerce, education, employment, 
personal relationships, and recreation.”92 Blanck likewise argues that the application 
of the ADA to the Internet “[m]ore than any other means ever conceived . . . holds 
the promise to advance integrationalism and participation” and that, for people with 
disabilities, the “community enfranchisement [of Internet accessibility] constitutes 
tangible engagement and connection with others.”93 Ekstrand argues for conceiving 
the ADA in terms of the right of “people with disabilities [to] speak, gather, organize 
and know each other in virtual space.”94 And disability scholars have also identified 
good reasons to reject an external perspective on Internet accessibility—for example, 
Paul Jaeger argues for putting “more emphasis on human-focused arguments for 
 
 
 88. See id. 
 89. See supra notes 42–44, 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 90. See supra notes 42–44, 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 91. Areheart & Stein, supra note 8, at 456–58. 
 92. Id. Of course, how the Internet works may be outcome determinative of its 
accessibility. 
 93. BLANCK, supra note 5, at 40–41. 
 94. Ekstrand, supra note 64, at 430–31. 
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accessibility” because “[l]egal and technical standards are too distant and inhuman 
to capture the very profound personal impacts of inaccessibility on people with 
disabilities.”95  
The doctrinal contours of Title III and normative importance of focusing 
specifically on the lived experience of people with disabilities understandably 
counsel toward adopting an internal perspective and rejecting an external one. In the 
context of advocating for Title III’s applicability to websites, an internal perspective 
may be truly mutually exclusive with an external one—that is, Title III effectively 
forces advocates and scholars to view Internet accessibility through an internal lens, 
or incur substantial risk of losing Title III website cases and undervaluing the rights 
of people with disabilities that are at the heart of the ADA. 
Thus, I agree with disability law scholars and advocates about the doctrinal need 
to approach the application of Title III to the Internet through an internal perspective 
focused on websites—and the normative need to consider an internal perspective to 
Internet accessibility more generally. However, as I explain in the next Section, there 
are good reasons for pro-accessibility advocates and scholars to augment this internal 
perspective with an external one. 
B. Layer-Consciousness as an External Perspective 
As the previous Section describes, there are compelling reasons to maintain an 
internal perspective in promoting Internet accessibility and doctrinally considering 
Title III’s application to the Internet. However, some Internet-law scholars have 
rejected the need to choose between internal and external perspectives.96 Brett 
Frischmann, for example, argues that both internal and external perspectives are 
“descriptively valid and real” and “yield important insights about the facts of the 
Internet and the interests at stake.”97 Frischmann also argues that focusing on a single 
perspective risks “mask[ing] important policy decisions in the rhetoric of metaphor 
and factual analogy.”98 Jonathon Penney likewise urges a less hierarchical approach 
to perspective that focuses on internal concerns but is also willing to consider 
external concerns.99 
In that spirit, it is worth acknowledging a key drawback of the place-centric 
internal perspective for Internet accessibility: it has focused much disability law 
jurisprudence and scholarship on the aspects of the Internet that are most readily 
amenable to the place metaphor—namely, websites. This is because websites can be 
 
 
 95. Paul T. Jaeger, Disability, Human Rights, and Social Justice: The Ongoing Struggle 
for Online Accessibility and Equality, FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 7, 2015), 
https://uncommonculture.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6164/4898 [https://perma.cc/ 
6ZN9-L3WL]. 
 96. E.g., Brett M. Frischmann, The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace, 35 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205 (2003); Penney, supra note 81. But see Cohen, supra note 74, at 226 
(“[R]esistance to spatialization persists . . . largely because of misunderstandings about both 
the kind of spatiality that the ‘cyberspace’ metaphor expresses and the processes by which the 
metaphor operates.”). 
 97. Frischmann, supra note 96, at 207. 
 98. Id. at 208. 
 99. Penney, supra note 81, at 204. 
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colloquially understood even by non-tech-savvy judges and policymakers as 
“places” that an Internet user “visits.”100  
But an external perspective reveals that the Internet is much more than a collection 
of websites. The goal of Internet accessibility embraced by disability scholars and 
arguably embodied in at least the spirit of the ADA, and perhaps its letter, is to make 
the entirety of the content, interactions, and functionality of the Internet—not just 
websites—accessible to and usable by people with disabilities. In this Section, then, 
I use an external perspective to illuminate several contexts in which Internet-enabled 
technology manifests outside the bounds of websites, turning in the next Part to the 
implications for Internet accessibility. 
As early as 1999, before the Title III website battles had begun in earnest, Tim 
Wu critiqued the prevailing singular, web-centric conception of the Internet as “too 
small to capture the dramatic diversity” of the early Internet.101 The World Wide 
Web—the collection of websites that adhere to standards developed by the World 
Wide Web Consortium—is only one application on the Internet, which, even in 
1999, supported numerous others including e-mail, instant messaging and chat, 
remote administration of computers, file transfer, Usenet (a collection of discussion 
forums), MUDs (multiuser dungeons—early network-enabled multiplayer video 
games), and more.102 Today, Internet users can access a wide variety of Internet-
enabled applications, from streaming video and audio, to elaborate massively 
multiplayer online games and virtual worlds, to real-time navigation, to voice and 
video communication, to electronic books, to virtual and augmented reality. 
From an external perspective, just as the World Wide Web (and its constituent 
websites) is only one of the many applications enabled by the Internet, making 
websites accessible to people who rely on screen readers represents only one of the 
many challenges entailed in making the whole of the Internet accessible. While 
questions remain about the application of Title III to websites,103 a place-centric 
conceptualization of Title III that treats websites as places of public accommodation 
under the ADA leaves unanswered questions about making the whole range of 
Internet applications accessible—many of which might in turn be amenable to an 
internal, place-centric application of Title III. In this light, a framework capable of 
illuminating the constituent parts of the Internet in a more granular fashion is 
necessary. 
As a starting point, it is helpful to consider the wide variety of Internet-enabled 
applications available today. That proliferation is no accident, but a function of the 
deliberate, normative goal expressed in the “end-to-end” network design argument 
of Internet pioneers Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, and David Clark.104 The goal of the 
end-to-end principle, motivated in part by a desire to avoid AT&T’s iron-fisted 
control over the telephone system, was to leave application intelligence at the 
 
 
 100. See, e.g., Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 
1176 (1999) (discussing the conception that “a user actively ‘goes out and visits’ websites”). 
 101. Id. at 1163. 
 102. Id. at 1169. 
 103. See supra notes 47–61 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Wu, supra note 100, at 1164–65 (citing J. H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed & D. D. Clark, 
End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS 277 
(1984)). 
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endpoints of a network, leaving to the network itself no more than the job of carrying 
application data from one point to another.105  
As a result, the modern Internet uses a layered design where, in oversimplified 
terms, arbitrary applications can ride atop a set of common basic data transmission 
protocols (most famously, the Internet Protocol (IP)) which in turn, can be used to 
encapsulate data for transmission across any number of arbitrary, interconnected 
physical networks—whether coaxial cable networks, the copper telephone network, 
fiber-optic cable networks, or terrestrial or satellite wireless networks.106 In other 
words, the Internet Protocol, administered by Internet access service, backbone, and 
other providers, serves as a digital common language for any user on the Internet to 
use any application—whether sending an e-mail, requesting the contents of a 
website, or downloading a file—to communicate with any other user on the Internet, 
with both users having the flexibility to use any Internet access provider with the 
comfort of knowing that the “network of networks” will ultimately convey the 
communication from one endpoint to the other. This layered architecture has resulted 
in what Jonathan Zittrain has termed “generativity”—the Internet’s “capacity to 
produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from broad and varied 
audiences.”107 These contributions materialize in the aforementioned proliferation of 
applications.108 
Multiple generations of Internet-law scholars have advocated for addressing 
societal problems on the Internet with a nuanced understanding of this layered 
architecture.109 Though the full implications of the layered model (and the conception 
 
 
 105. See Saltzer et al., supra note 104. 
 106. See D. Waitzman, A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams on Avian 
Carriers, RFC EDITOR (Apr. 1, 1990), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1149 [https://perma.cc 
/JG7W-WEG3] (explaining, tongue-in-cheek, how Internet Protocol packets can be 
transmitted by printing their contents on scrolls of paper secured to the legs of birds, then 
removed and scanned by a recipient). 
 107. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 70–71 
(2007); see also James Grimmelmann & Paul Ohm, Dr. Generative Or: How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Love the iPhone, 69 MD. L. REV. 910, 926 (2010) (noting the importance 
of generativity on computers connected to the Internet). 
 108. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 107, at 70–71. 
 109. See, e.g., DAVID POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
CYBERSPACE (2009); BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 
(2010); ZITTRAIN, supra note 107; Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the 
Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 561, 561–63 (2000); John Blevins, The New Scarcity: A First Amendment 
Framework for Regulating Access to Digital Media Platforms, 79 TENN. L. REV. 353 (2012); 
Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious Approach, 24 B.U. J. SCI. 
& TECH. L. 193 (2018); Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications 
Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359 (2007); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-
End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 
(2001); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 501, 519 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet 
Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (2004); Kevin Werbach, Breaking the 
Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the Digital Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 59 (2005); Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. 
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of the layers themselves) are hotly debated and beyond the scope of this Article, three 
insights are worth noting for the purposes of accessibility law: the principles of layer 
separation, minimizing layer crossing, and application-centered analysis. 
First, as Larry Solum and Minn Chung have emphasized, the layered architecture 
of the Internet is not merely a description of the Internet, but a normative 
manifestation of the end-to-end principle—that is, the Internet not only is layered, 
but was designed to be and should remain so.110 Second, as a result, Solum and 
Chung argue, regulatory regimes governing the Internet should, where possible, 
respect and maintain the layered architecture of the Internet by targeting regulations 
directly at the layers where problems occur—what Solum and Chung call the  
principle of layer separation.111 Where that is impossible, regulatory regimes should 
target regulations as proximately as possible to those problems—what Solum and 
Chung call the principle of minimizing layer crossing.112 As I explain in the next 
Part, these principles are important considerations for Internet accessibility because 
they counsel toward both ensuring a full accounting of accessibility problems across 
the full scope of the Internet and strive to ensure that people with disabilities can 
access Internet technologies of their own choosing on their own terms rather than 
being relegated to an isolated “accessible” subset of the Internet—though they are 
challenged by the economics of making applications and content accessible at 
scale.113 
Third, Wu and others make clear that the panoply of Internet-enabled applications 
vary widely in terms of their social salience and attendant problems.114 As a result, 
different applications require different analytical frames and the problems those 
frames reveal require different interventions—what Wu terms “application-centered 
analysis.”115 As I explain in the next Part, accessibility issues manifest in 
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significantly different ways across different applications that warrant different 
interventions.  
The principles of layer separation, minimizing layer crossing, and application-
centered analysis demand a more concrete account of the relevant layers. Though 
more specific models describe in detail how traffic flows over the Internet,116 
Internet-law scholars have frequently invoked a simplified model with four distinct 
layers, visualized vertically and adjacently in a “stack” format (the “layer stack”), 
which are worth contemplating for the purpose of Internet accessibility:117 
1. The distinct content layer articulated by Yochai Benkler and others,118 
which disentangles the individual pieces of content transmitted within 
each application—the individual websites (content) comprising the 
World Wide Web (application), the individual articles (content) 
comprising Wikipedia (application), the individual messages (content) 
sent via e-mail (application), the individual videos (content) served up 
via a streaming video service (application), and so on. 
 
2. The application layer emphasized by Wu, encapsulating the various 
applications that facilitate the delivery of content to and from users—
streaming video, e-mail, instant messaging, VoIP, etc.—with which 
users interact. 
 
3. The network (protocol) layer, primarily encapsulating the Internet 
Protocol and related protocols that structure the underlying transmissions 
required to operate the applications, which are administered by Internet 




 116. More formal and complex layer models exist to describe the function of the Internet. 
One of the earliest and still most-recognized is the seven-layer model articulated by the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) subcommittee of the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), which divides the Internet into application, presentation, session, 
transport, network, data link, and physical layers. Hubert Zimmermann, OSI Reference 
Model—The ISO Model of Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection, COM-28 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS COMMS. 425, 430 & fig. 13 (Apr. 1980), http://www.ce.uniroma2.it/~lopresti 
/Didattica/Biss2010/BasicInterntetTCPIP/OSI.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGE3-XV5F]; see also 
RACHELLE MILLER, SANS INST., THE OSI MODEL: AN OVERVIEW (2001), 
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/standards/osi-model-overview-543 
[https://perma.cc/KNP2-MX7W]. J. Pierre de Vries, Ljiljana Simić, Petri Mähönen, and 
Marina Petrova have proposed reconceptualizing the seven-layer OSI stack as a circle, and 
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businesses and social practices of entities on the network, which in turn inform the Layer Zero 
regulatory decisions. Ljiljana Simić, Petri Mähönen, Marina Petrova & J. Pierre de Vries, 
Illuminating the Road from Engineering and Policy to Radio Regulation (2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031656 [https://perma.cc 
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2020] INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND DISABILITY  613 
 
4. The physical layer, encapsulating the various types of wired and 
wireless Internet access services, such as coaxial cable and cable modem 
technology, digital subscriber line (DSL) for copper telephone wires, and 
cellular telephone networks, which carry the signals logically described 
at the network layer and which are deployed and maintained by various 
types of Internet service providers. 
Finally, I posit the important role of devices, such as desktop and laptop PCs, 
smartphones and tablets, speakers with embedded virtual assistants like Amazon’s 
Echo, wearable “smart” clothing, and more—typically referred to as the “Internet of 
Things.”119 Though generally considered adjacent to the Internet layer stack as a 
formal matter (and, from a computer organization perspective, often possessing a 
distinctively layered architecture themselves), Internet-enabled devices play a critical 
role in physically connecting their users to the Internet and enabling them to operate 
applications and engage with content.120  
 Important accessibility issues arise in and across each of these contexts, which I 
illustrate in the next Part. 
III. A LAYER-CONSCIOUS APPROACH TO INTERNET ACCESSIBILITY 
The primary instrumental objective of applying disability law in any context is to 
address discrimination against people with disabilities by way of accessibility 
mandates—and the details of those mandates are critical. As Alex Geisinger and 
Michael Stein have described, the “ambit of protection” of disability law depends on 
the extent to which the “attendant [regulatory scheme] details precisely what . . . must 
be altered and how.”121 With the previous Part’s insights into questions of perspective 
in mind, I turn in this Part to augmenting the internal, place- and website-centric 
perspective of Internet accessibility with an external, layer-conscious view that 
contemplates what is necessary to ensure accessibility at and across each of the 
constituent layers of the Internet. This approach is consonant with the approach of 
Robin Malloy who, borrowing from the Internet-law concept of “network goods,” 
has argued for approaching inclusive design in the context of land use planning with 
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an understanding of the network goods, services, businesses, housing, 
neighborhoods, and civil and cultural activities of cities.122 
As the foregoing sections of this Article imply, Geisinger and Stein’s question of 
“what”—i.e., the relevant scope of Internet-enabled technology that is or must be 
covered by disability law—predominates this layer-conscious analysis. As this Part 
notes throughout, questions of the ultimate scope of Title III arise and must also be 
augmented by consideration of the role of other titles of the ADA, other disability 
laws, and other consumer protection laws,123 particularly the provisions of 
telecommunications law administered by the Federal Communications Commission. 
Geisinger and Stein’s question of “how”—the technical details of the changes that 
accessibility requires, from screen reader compatibility to closed captions to audio 
description to intermediated relay services to plain-language versions of content—
also enters the discussion to some degree,124 though their technical complexity leaves 
a complete exploration beyond the scope of this Article. While the Title III cases 
discussed above are primarily focused on the basic issue of screen reader 
compatibility with websites, what is required to make the whole Internet accessible 
to people with a range of disabilities raises a broader set of questions about how to 
address the accessibility of the wide variety of content, applications, networks, and 
devices that comprise the Internet. Each of these details—and their causal 
relationship with enabling people with disabilities to use the corresponding “place of 
public accommodation,” or not—fit neatly in what technology law scholars call 
“affordances” and “disaffordances” (i.e., how the relationship between a technology 
and its user facilitates or inhibits particular actions or behaviors by the user).125 
Most importantly, though, this Part adds to the usual questions of “what” and 
“how” a significant focus the question of “who”—i.e., which people or entities bear 
the responsibility for accessibility mandates. While disability scholars and advocates 
often discuss accessibility in terms of a right for people with disabilities, to whom 
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the corresponding duty belongs is a critical question.126 While the answer is often the 
easily identified corporate proprietor of a website in Title III cases, the layered nature 
of the Internet means that the internal perspective of using an application or 
experiencing content may obscure that there are multiple actors involved in its 
provision. Because the question of who bears responsibility for accessibility—
whether from a legal, normative, or architectural perspective—is perhaps the most 
sweeping addition to the usual set of disability law questions, this Part considers the 
Internet’s layers in terms of the categorical actors most likely to be responsible for, 
and thus able to effectuate accessibility at, each layer of the stack.127 
Accordingly, this Part aims to disentangle the application and content layers, 
which are often conflated in Title III scholarship and litigation, by first exploring the 
distinction between individual websites and the broader World Wide Web. It then 
turns to the underappreciated role of web hosting applications in making website 
content accessible. Moving beyond the web, it turns to the set of dominant platforms 
that intermediate the provision of content in a variety of applications beyond the web. 
This Part closes with a discussion of accessibility considerations specific to Internet 
service providers at the network and physical layers and devices that comprise the 
so-called Internet of Things. 
A. Disentangling Content and Application: Website vs. Web Accessibility  
Superficially, Title III website cases are relatively simple matters of imposing 
straightforward regulations on easy-to-identify entities operating discrete, self-
contained applications. Most cases that successfully overcome Title III’s websites- 
as-places barrier require the sole proprietor of a self-contained website, such as a 
restaurant chain providing menu information128 or the ability to place delivery orders 
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another person with a correlative duty . . . in terms of . . . assistance.”); Pierre Schlag, How to 
Do Things with Hohfeld, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 200 (2015) (describing the relations 
of jural correlatives). 
 127. Jacqueline Lipton has described these actors as “Internet intermediaries” who 
intermediate and facilitate essentially all online experiences. Lipton, supra note 74, at 1342–
43. 
 128. E.g., Markett v. Five Guys Enters. LLC, No. 17-cv-788, 2017 WL 5054568, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2017). 
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online,129 an online retail store selling goods,130 or a brick-and-mortar retail store 
providing a complementary website for its in-store services,131 to remediate a 
website’s structure to be compatible with screen reader software for users who are 
blind or visually impaired.132 The what, who, and how seem on first blush to be 
relatively simple for these websites—Title III compels their proprietors to make them 
accessible to blind people. 
But even for sole-proprietor websites, the questions of who and how are more 
complex, viewed from an external perspective, than they might initially appear from 
an internal perspective of the user’s experience. While individual websites can be 
conceptualized as discrete applications, they can also be conceptualized collectively 
as the constituent content of the World Wide Web as an application.133 While the 
web is decentralized in the sense that there is no single proprietor of every website, 
the web is centralized in the sense that websites use a common set of technologies, 
specified in standards developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and 
other standards-setting organizations. These standards include Hypertext Markup 
Language (HTML) and Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), which enable the design of 
the universal web browsers we use to view websites without the need for specialized 
software specific to individual websites.134 
The accessibility of individual websites, then, is dependent not only on the 
architecture implemented by their proprietors, but on the centralized development of 
standards that facilitate accessibility. The W3C has developed voluntary guidelines 
for web accessibility, called the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG), 
 
 
 129. E.g., Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. CV-16-06599, 2017 WL 1330216, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017), rev’d 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 122 
(2019). 
 130. E.g., Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 
2017). 
 131. E.g., Gorecki v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. CV-17-1131-JFW, 2017 WL 
2957736, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017); Gil v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 3d 
1315, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2017); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 
949–50 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 132. See also Feingold, supra note 51 (citing various settlement agreements involving 
integrated entities). But see Anderson v. Macy’s Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00556, 2012 WL 3155717, 
at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2012) (highlighting the complexity of litigation involving related 
corporate entities that are separately responsible for a company’s linked brick-and-mortar and 
online presences). 
 133. The etymology of the World Wide Web traces back to Tim Berners-Lee’s original 
WorldWideWeb browser application. Tim Berners-Lee, The WorldWideWeb Browser, 
W3.ORG, https://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/WorldWideWeb.html [https://perma.cc 
/XFT9-JAJZ]. 
 134. See generally Standards, W3C, https://www.w3.org/standards/ [https://perma.cc 
/RTS3-86Y6]. 
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which generally specify how websites can be developed in a way that is accessible 
to people with disabilities.135 The WCAG standards136 require that websites be: 
1. Perceivable by users with disabilities137—for example, by providing 
text alternatives for images for users who are blind or visually 
impaired138 or avoiding the use of color contrasts that cannot be viewed 
by users who are colorblind;139 
 
2. Operable by users with disabilities140—for example, by structuring the 
site to allow navigation with a keyboard so that users who are blind or 
visually impaired need not use a graphical input mechanism like a 
mouse141 and avoiding the use of flashing graphics that might cause 
seizures for users with epilepsy;142 
 
3. Understandable by users with disabilities143—for example, by 
providing a mechanism for identifying definitions of unusual idioms and 
jargon that may pose difficulty to users with cognitive or intellectual 
disabilities;144 and  
 
4. Robust in their compatibility with different assistive technologies.145 
The standards are divided into three levels of “conformance”—A, AA, and AAA—
which include increasingly rigorous requirements.146 
At the outset, WCAG’s governance raises an important disconnect: while the duty 
of website accessibility under U.S. law at least arguably falls on the proprietors of 
websites (qua places under Title III), the meaning of accessibility across the entire 
web is primarily set, if at all, by an international standards-setting organization that 
 
 
 135. See generally LAZAR ET AL., supra note 6, at 60–65; Web Content Accessibility 
Guidelines (WCAG) Overview, W3C, https://www.w3.org/WAI/standards-guidelines/wcag/ 
[https://perma.cc/YL4W-MUG3]. Though their details are beyond the scope of this Article, 
the W3C has also developed additional guidelines for User Agents (UAAG) and Accessible 
Rich Internet Applications (ARIA). 
 136. For the most recent version of WCAG, see Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 
(WCAG) 2.1, W3C (June 5, 2018), https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG21/ [https://perma.cc 
/9LUJ-36MD], though many website accessibility cases refer to the previous version of the 
standard, Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, W3C (Dec. 11, 2008), 
https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG20/ [https://perma.cc/7CR2-QMT2].  
 137. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.1 Recommendation § 1.0, W3C (June 5, 
2018), https://www.w3.org/TR/2018/REC-WCAG21-20180605/#perceivable [https://perma 
.cc/J42V-Y53T]. 
 138. Id. § 1.1. 
 139. Id. § 1.4. 
 140. Id. § 2. 
 141. Id. § 2.1. 
 142. Id. § 2.3. 
 143. Id. § 3. 
 144. Id. § 3.1.3. 
 145. Id. § 4. 
 146. Id. § 5.2.1. 
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is not subject to Title III. That is, the accessibility obligations of websites at the 
content layer are dependent on standards independently developed for the web at the 
application layer by an entity, the W3C, which is never a party to Title III website 
accessibility litigation.147 
The role of the WCAG standards has raised nontrivial concerns about what 
exactly is required to make a website legally accessible. For example, the Central 
District of Florida in Robles recently dismissed a complaint against Domino’s Pizza 
on due process grounds because of the lack of clarity on what standards would suffice 
for web accessibility148—though the holding was reversed149 and other courts have 
reached the opposite conclusion.150 The Robles district court cited the lack of 
resolution in the DOJ’s now-withdrawn rulemaking for website standards,151 which 
specifically raised (but did not resolve) the question of whether and which level of 
WCAG standards should be formally incorporated into the DOJ’s Title III 
regulations for websites.152 While advocates have cheered the reversal of Robles, the 
lack of clarity about the extent of WCAG’s applicability has hindered the viability 
and longevity of other Title III victories when questions arise about the standard of 
conduct that Title III imposes on websites—highly technical questions which 
generalist federal court judges seem poorly equipped to answer.153 
Even if WCAG is ultimately able to be incorporated into DOJ’s rules and 
administered by federal courts, questions remain about its suitability. Peter Blanck 
has criticized reliance on WCAG and other standards alone as insufficient to serve 
the underlying goal of web “equality” for all people with disabilities, noting in 
particular that the approach of evaluating website compliance with WCAG standards 
emphasizes accessibility of website content for people with sensory disabilities at the 
expense of website usability for people with cognitive and intellectual disabilities.154 
And WCAG has substantive accessibility shortcomings in the area of media 
accessibility; for example, its standards for the quality of closed captions are 
substantially less detailed than those of the FCC’s detailed regulations for closed 
captions on television programming.155  
 
 
 147. No Title III cases to date have involved standards-setting bodies as defendants or 
intervenors, nor is it clear the circumstances under which such a case might arise. 
 148. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. CV-16-06599, 2017 WL 1330216, at *1, *5 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017), rev’d, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 122 
(2019). 
 149. Domino’s Pizza, 913 F.3d at 902. 
 150. E.g., Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-CV-116-JL, 2017 WL 5186354, 
at *9 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017). 
 151. Robles, 2017 WL 1330216, at *5. 
 152. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and 
Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 
43,460, 43,465 (proposed July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 36). 
 153. See, e.g., David Titmus, Viewers, ‘Queer Eye’ Star Bring Caption Quality Concerns 
to Netflix, VITAC.COM (July 3, 2018), https://www.vitac.com/viewers-queer-eye-star-bring-
caption-quality-concerns-to-netflix/ [https://perma.cc/MUE3-36AN] (raising concerns about 
the quality of closed captions provided by Netflix under its Title III settlement with the 
National Association of the Deaf). 
 154. See BLANCK, supra note 5, at 45–52. 
 155. Compare Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.1 Recommendation § 1.2, W3C 
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While a full grappling with the governance and substantive advantages and 
disadvantages of WCAG is beyond the scope of this Article, it suffices to note that 
in terms of allocating responsibility, focusing Title III and its attendant legal 
institutions, including the federal courts and the DOJ in a rulemaking and settlement 
capacity, on the content layer of the web may leave significant shortcomings in the 
contours of the accessibility of the web as an application. At most, Title III has 
supported the importation of WCAG into the ADA—but neither the courts nor DOJ 
have demonstrated a significant ability to interrogate the suitability of WCAG in 
serving Title III’s goals, to alter and augment the content of WCAG to serve the goal 
of website accessibility, or to provide sophisticated and muscular enforcement of its 
terms.156 However well a place-centric approach to Title III can establish that 
websites must be accessible, the external perspective of websites as content and the 
web as an application raises questions about the ability for that approach to address 
the substance of accessibility requirements at the application layer. 
B. Allocating Responsibility on a Platform-Based Web 
Setting aside the desire for robust and consistent substantive requirements for 
accessibility across the web as an application, the internal perspective fostered by 
Title III’s place centricity maintains a temptation to insist on holding individual 
websites wholly accountable for their accessibility failures. In terms of 
antidiscrimination theory, that website proprietors may be ignorant about what must 
be done to make their websites accessible is no less an economically driven choice—
and a morally repugnant one—than a choice to knowingly and deliberately exclude 
people with disabilities from websites.157 
But the layered architecture of the Internet—and the corresponding involvement 
of multiple entities in sculpting the user experience—will continue to raise questions 
about how, as a practical matter, to allocate responsibility and liability among these 
entities, even if the user is not actively aware that some of them exist and are playing 
a key role in intermediating the user’s experience.158 These questions are underscored 
by the reality that the majority of websites are not built from scratch by their 
 
 
(June 6, 2018), https://www.w3.org/TR/2018/REC-WCAG21-20180605/#time-based-media 
[https://perma.cc/EP5X-TZ7T] (providing limited specificity about the provision of captions), 
with 47 C.F.R. § 79.1(j)(2) (2018) (providing detailed standards for accuracy, synchronicity, 
completeness, and placement of closed captions). See generally Closed Captioning of Video 
Programming, Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, Inc. Petition for 
Rulemaking, Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd. 2221 (2014), https://docs.fcc.gov/public 
/attachments/FCC-14-12A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY7G-M8E9] (implementing the closed 
captioning standards). 
 156.  No Web Accessibility Regs? No Excuses, LAW OFF. LAINEY FEINGOLD (Dec. 28, 
2017), https://www.lflegal.com/2017/12/withdrawn-regs/ [https://perma.cc/39D6-J452]. 
 157. See Bagenstos, supra note 14. 
 158. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 74, at 1342–43; cf. Martin Husovec, The Promises of 
Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement: Takedown or Staydown? Which Is Superior? And Why?, 
42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53, 73–80 (2018) (discussing the economics of different models for 
imposing responsibility on users and intermediaries/platforms in the context of copyright 
infringement). 
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proprietors, but instead by customizing elaborate commercial and open-source 
content management platforms like WordPress, Joomla, Drupal, Squarespace, and 
Shopify that abstract much of the underlying architecture to allow nontechnical 
proprietors to develop the content with limited or no knowledge of the code that is 
generated.159 If the web can be said to have any centralized points of operational 
responsibility at the application layer, they are the platforms that serve the majority 
of the world’s websites. 
While some accessibility issues with websites hosted by these platforms are 
dependent on the code and content developed by their proprietors, such as adding 
alternate text tags to images for use by blind users or captions and other nonaural 
substitutes to audio content for users who are deaf or hard of hearing, many 
accessibility issues are rooted in the structure of the platforms themselves, the 
templates they provide users, and the tools they provide to author website content. 
The importance of authoring tools is so significant that W3C has developed a 
separate set of Authoring Tool Accessibility Guidelines (ATAG) aimed at platforms 
and other authoring tools.160 ATAG requires platforms to support the production of 
accessible content by:161 
1. Providing authors with behavioral nudges and facilities to make the 
content of their websites accessible from the outset162 and remediate 
accessibility problems on existing websites.163 
 
2. Making website templates and reusable content, such as stock photos, 
accessible by default.164 
 
3. Ensuring that automatic authoring processes spit out accessible 
website code and preserve accessibility information, such as alternate 




 159. Of the top ten million websites, nearly fifty-five percent use a content management 
system. Usage of Content Management Systems, W3TECHS, https://w3techs.com/technologies 
/overview/content_management/all [https://perma.cc/D6MW-K5U3].  
 160. Authoring Tool Accessibility Guidelines (ATAG) Overview, W3C, 
https://www.w3.org/WAI/standards-guidelines/atag/ [https://perma.cc/S583-XZ8L] (Sept. 
24, 2015). See  LAZAR ET AL., supra note 6, at 65–68 (discussing ATAG); ANGEL ANTKERS, 
SUSAN MILLER, SOPHIA GALLEHER, BLAKE E. REID & BRIANNA L. SCHOFIELD, AUTHORSHIP 
AND ACCESSIBILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=3254959 [https://perma.cc/9AN6-2AS3] (discussing the shortcomings and 
improvement of digital content authoring tools). 
 161. Authoring Tool Accessibility Guidelines (ATAG) 2, W3C (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter 
ATAG], https://www.w3.org/TR/ATAG20/ [https://perma.cc/3AQS-B76S]. 
 162. Id. §§ B.2.1–B.2.3. 
 163. Id. § B.3. 
 164. Id. §§ B.2.4–B.2.5. 
 165. Id. § B.1. 
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4. Making authoring tools accessible by authors with disabilities166—a 
key step in related efforts to stop the proliferation of the false dichotomy 
between authors and people with disabilities.167 
 
5. Promote the availability of accessibility features.168 
Despite the development of ATAG, accessibility issues with website hosting 
platforms remain significant. For example, in 2018, the lead accessibility designer of 
WordPress, which hosts more than a third of the world’s ten million most popular 
websites,169 publicly resigned in protest because there were “so many accessibility 
issues” in Gutenberg, a newly developed version of WordPress’s website editor, that 
“most testers [examining accessibility and usability issues] refused to look at [it] 
again.”170 And other leading platforms include in their support documents explicit 
disclaimers of compliance with website accessibility laws like Title III171—
effectively seeking to leverage contract law to shift the responsibility for 
accessibility, at least in a legal sense, to the proprietors of websites that use the 
platforms. 
Though the accessibility on a majority of the world’s most popular websites is 
dependent in significant part on accessibility support of just half a dozen or fewer 
web hosting platforms, no significant litigation or settlement agreements have yet 
addressed website platforms. This is the case even though Title III litigation has 
undoubtedly targeted websites hosted on these platforms, rooted in problems caused 
by the platforms rather than the platform user/website proprietor.172 
 
 
 166. Id. § A. 
 167. See ANTKERS ET AL., supra note 160, at 8. See generally RESISTANCE AND HOPE: 
ESSAYS BY DISABLED PEOPLE (Alice Wong ed., 2018), https://disabilityvisibilityproject.com 
/resist/ [https://perma.cc/PND8-URZ4]. 
 168. See ATAG, supra note 161, § B.4.1. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Rian Rietveld, I Have Resigned as the WordPress Accessibility Team Lead. Here Is 
Why., RIAN RIETVELD (Oct. 9, 2018), https://rianrietveld.com/2018/10/09/i-have-resigned-the 
-wordpress-accessibility-team/ [https://perma.cc/4LKP-XN3T] (emphasis in original).  
 171. See Making Your Squarespace Site More Accessible, SQUARESPACE, 
https://support.squarespace.com/hc/en-us/articles/215129127-Making-your-Squarespace 
-site-more-accessible [https://perma.cc/LR2W-VMEF] (last updated Apr. 8, 2019) 
(“Squarespace can't provide advice about making your site compliant with specific web 
accessibility laws or acts.”); Accessibility Statement, JOOMLA!, https://www.joomla.org 
/accessibility-statement.html [https://perma.cc/XYX2-SLYJ] (“The Joomla! Project is not 
responsible for compliance with the standards of accessibility of applications and extensions 
created with and/or for the Joomla! CMS and Framework.”). But see Accessibility, DRUPAL, 
https://www.drupal.org/about/features/accessibility [https://perma.cc/Z97L-PSSD] (“We 
have committed to ensuring that all features of Drupal core conform with the World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) guidelines.”); Accessibility Policy, SHOPIFY, https://www.shopify 
.com/accessibility/policy [https://perma.cc/5HP9-KC5F] (“Shopify is committed to 
maintaining an accessible environment for persons with disabilities.”). 
 172. See, e.g., HortonGroup, My Client Got Sued for ADA Compliance, How Compliant 
Are Your Websites?, SQUARESPACE (May 10, 2018, 9:28 PM), https://web.archive.org/web 
/20190906023851/https://answers.squarespace.com/questions/218158/my-client-got-sued-
for-ada-compliance-how-complian.html [https://perma.cc/RY5Q-G62G]. 
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The lack of lawsuits against website hosting platforms likely is a dual function of 
Title III’s doctrinal focus on places and the associated internal perspective on the 
user experience that focus demands. That is, it is unclear to an ordinary user that a 
website’s inaccessibility stems from failures in the codebase of an underlying 
platform—a platform whose very existence may be unknown to the user. It may well 
be that Title III will be able to target website platforms as a doctrinal matter, but 
doing so will require a conception of Title III that goes beyond “places” and 
addresses the accessibility dimensions of the Internet’s infrastructure.173  
C. Application Accessibility Beyond the Web 
Allocating responsibility among website proprietors and hosting platforms 
previews the broader challenge of addressing responsibility for accessibility across 
the diversity of non-web Internet applications. Since even the early days of the 
commercial Internet when the web dominated Internet use, the Internet has supported 
a significant quantity of non-web applications.174 Today, the most popular of these 
applications include video streaming, gaming, social media, shopping, file sharing, 
and instant messaging,175 the provision of which has come to be dominated by large 
“platform” companies such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, Netflix, and Amazon.176  
 
 
 173. Compare Earll v. Ebay, Inc., 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting Title 
III’s application to eBay’s auction platform), Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 
1024 (N.D. Cal. 2012), Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115–16 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (same for Facebook’s social media platform), and Ouellette v. Viacom, No. CV 10-133-
M-DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 1882780, at *4–5 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2011) (same for platforms 
hosted by Google, Myspace, etc.), with Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 
565, 573–74 (D. Vt. 2015), and Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 
200 (D. Mass. 2012) (applying Title III to Netflix, a platform for video programming). 
 174. See supra Section II.B. 
 175. C.f., e.g., SANDVINE, THE GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA REPORT 6 (2018), 
https://www.sandvine.com/hubfs/downloads/phenomena/2018-phenomena-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YWB8-22FN] (measuring application popularity in terms of traffic). 
 176. I use the terms “platforms” and “intermediaries” interchangeably here simply to refer 
to Internet-enabled applications that intermediate access to content. But Internet law scholars 
have explored in much more significant depth the definitions of the terms “platform,” 
“intermediary,” and related terms. E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 143 (2017) (describing platforms as “represent[ing] infrastructure-
based strategies for introducing friction into networks”); Tarleton Gillespie, Platforms Are Not 
Intermediaries, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 198, 201 (2018) (describing the essential quality of 
platforms as offering moderation of content); Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms’, 
12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347 (2010) (examining discourse around the term “platform”); 
Lipton, supra note 74, at 1343–44 (defining an “Internet intermediary” as “any service 
provider that enables online interaction through either paid subscription or general availability 
to the public”); Frank Pasquale, Tech Platforms and the Knowledge Problem, II AM. AFFAIRS 
3, 8 (2018) (characterizing the “largest, most successful firms” as “platforms [that] ran[k] and 
rat[e] other entities rather than directly providing goods and services”); Philip J. Weiser, Law 
and Information Platforms, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 3–4 (2002) (defining 
“information platforms” in terms of “network standards around which complementary 
products must be developed”); see also Ben Thompson, Defining Aggregators, STRATECHERY 
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://stratechery.com/2017/defining-aggregators/ [https://perma.cc/4YPG-
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For accessibility purposes, a critical distinction between the web and these other 
applications is that the user interacts with the platform as an application, which in 
turn intermediates access to the platform’s content. That is, a user accessing a 
restaurant’s website may have no idea that the website is hosted on WordPress or 
Squarespace, and a user watching a video on Netflix or YouTube might not know 
the identity of the entity or person responsible for creating the video. And even where 
a user knows the identity of the person responsible for creating content—for 
example, the person posting personal photos to a social media platform such as 
Facebook or Instagram—accessibility problems are likely to pervade classes of 
media across millions or billions of users on a platform. From an internal perspective, 
then, the logical target of a Title III lawsuit might likely be the platform operating 
the application rather than the entity or person responsible for creating the content. 
Of course, a threshold issue for holding these platforms directly accountable for 
accessibility is whether they can be subject to Title III in the first instance. The 
limited litigation targeting platforms under Title III has led to mixed results, with 
some courts dismissing cases on the predictable grounds that platforms do not 
constitute physical places.177 Even cases where courts have extended Title III liability 
to platform operators have focused on the portions of those applications accessible 
via their operators’ websites,178 and it remains unclear whether Title III will be 
sufficiently flexible to extend to the components of platform applications provided 
via native smartphone, tablet, and television/set-top box applications not so easily 
amenable to Title III’s place metaphor.179 It is unclear the extent to which other 
applications, such as video games, will fit within Title III180 or regulations 
promulgated by the FCC.181 
Questions of substance also abound. Just as legal requirements for making a 
website accessible to a user who is blind or visually impaired have been hashed out 
in significant depth,182 the FCC has grappled with the contours of making video 
 
 
27PD] (defining “aggregators” as “hav[ing] a direct relationship with users,” incurring zero 
marginal costs in serving users, and having by “[d]emand-driven [m]ulti-sided [n]etworks with 
[d]ecreasing [a]cquisition [c]osts”).  
 177. See supra note 173. 
 178. E.g., Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200. 
 179. But cf. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, No. CV 16-06599 SJO (SPx), 2017 WL 
1330216, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017 ) (applying Title III to Domino’s Pizza’s mobile 
application); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 567 (D. Vt. 2015) 
(referencing Scribd’s associated applications); Lainey Feingold, First Addendum to MLB 
Settlement Agreement, LAW OFF. LAINEY FEINGOLD (June 5, 2012), https://www.lflegal.com 
/2012/06/mlb-addendum/ [https://perma.cc/HE4U-8642] (describing a settlement agreement 
under a Title III case addressing the accessibility of Major League Baseball’s mobile 
applications). See generally John Gruber, Web Apps vs. Native Apps is Still a Thing, DARING 
FIREBALL (Apr. 30, 2013), https://daringfireball.net/2013/04/web_apps_native_apps 
[https://perma.cc/CS42-V6GH] (describing the transition away from websites towards 
delivery of content via dedicated mobile applications for platforms like Apple’s iOS and 
Google’s Android). 
 180. See, e.g., Stern v. Sony Corp. of Am., 459 F. App’x 609, 610–11 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 181. See 47 C.F.R. pt. 14 (2018). The Advanced Communications Services rules are 
discussed in further depth, see infra Sections III.D and III.E. 
 182. See supra Section III.A.  
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programming183 and communications applications184 accessible to people with 
different disabilities. Moreover, as Peter Blanck has suggested, making the broad 
array of Internet applications accessible to people with cognitive and intellectual 
disabilities is substantially underexplored and remains a significant academic 
challenge in the area of Human-Computer Interface (HCI) design.185 Whether 
particular accessibility requirements ultimately will be sustained is not a given, 
either; the ADA’s fundamental alteration doctrine, which excludes from accessibility 
mandates requirements that would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the covered 
public accommodation, raises questions about what accessibility efforts might in fact 
be required by Title III.186 
But setting aside these threshold questions of what and how leaves the perhaps 
more significant question of who187—that is, how should disability law allocate 
responsibility between platform companies and the entities responsible for creating 
 
 
 183. See 47 C.F.R. pt. 79 (2018) (laying out detailed regulations for closed captioning, 
audio description, accessibility of emergency programming, and accessibility features for 
TVs, computers, and other devices capable of playing back videos). 
 184. See generally 47 C.F.R. pt. 14.1(a) (2018). The FCC’s advanced communications 
services rules are discussed in further depth, see infra Sections III.D & III.E. 
 185. BLANCK, supra note 5; see also Lawrence O. Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human 
Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application of Human 
Rights Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L. REV. 20 (2004) (discussing the international 
dimensions of the human rights of people with cognitive and intellectual disabilities). 
 186. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012); see also PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 
661 (2001) (the leading fundamental alteration case, concluding that allowing a golfer with a 
disability to use a golf cart did not fundamentally alter the game of golf); BLANCK, supra note 
5, at 131–36 (discussing in detail the intersection of Martin and fundamental alteration with 
web accessibility). Similar challenges have arisen in the context of the First Amendment, but 
many have been rejected by the courts. Compare, e.g., Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness, Inc. 
v. CNN, 742 F.3d 414, 430–32 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting First Amendment challenges to a 
closed captioning mandate, including that the mandate unlawfully compelled speech, 
constituted a prior restraint, and should be subject to strict scrutiny), Closed Captioning of 
Internet Protocol-Delivered Video Programming, Report and Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 787, 803–
04, (2012) [hereinafter IP Closed Captioning Order] (rejecting First Amendment challenges 
to the FCC’s closed captioning rules), and id. at 897 (statement of Commissioner Mignon L. 
Clyburn) (“[T]he promise of this rulemaking is much more than closed captioning for Internet-
delivered content. Its true aim is equal access for all Americans to the video programming that 
forms the lifeblood of our civil discourse and the marketplace of ideas embodied in the First 
Amendment.”) (Jan. 13, 2012), with Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 
801–06 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting the FCC’s implementation of video (audio) description 
rules on the grounds that the First Amendment implications required a narrow interpretation 
of the FCC’s authority under the Communications Act). See also Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 
297, 311 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting in dicta arguments that the First Amendment either 
compels the addition of or bars the requirement of closed captions by television broadcasters); 
cf. Lawrence O. Gostin, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Corpus of Anti-
Discrimination Law: A Force for Change in the Future of Public Health Regulation, 3 HEALTH 
MATRIX 89, 97–103 (1993) (noting in the context of health law the role of the ADA in 
augmenting the First Amendment rights of people with disabilities against overreach by public 
health authorities). 
 187. Of course, robots may play an increasing role in the improvement of accessibility. 
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content hosted by the platforms across a diverse array of arrangements?188 Platforms 
such as Netflix, which purchases the rights to movies, television shows, and other 
video programming via sophisticated commercial transactions, pose a different set 
of challenges than platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, eBay, 
Craigslist, and Wikipedia, which allow any user to submit content for intermediation 
at no direct cost. 
Even platforms that exercise a high degree of control over the content they 
distribute raise non-trivial questions of responsibility for accessibility. By way of 
example, Netflix is subject to extensive closed captioning requirements to provide 
equal access to people who are deaf or hard of hearing under a number of legal 
regimes. First, the FCC’s apparatus regulations require Netflix’s website and 
applications to support the display of closed captions provided with video 
programming on its website and mobile and set-top box applications.189 Second, the 
FCC’s IP closed captioning regulations require Netflix to provide closed captions 
themselves for any television programming with captions,190 which are required by 
the FCC for most television programming.191 And even Netflix’s original 
programming that has never been shown on television is subject to captioning 
obligations under a 2012 settlement agreement of Title III litigation with the National 
Association of the Deaf (NAD) that requires Netflix to caption all its content.192 
Notwithstanding the array of closed captioning requirements facing Netflix, 
problems still arise with closed captions, including most recently a social media 
firestorm over the censorship in captions of curse words that were not bleeped out 
from the audio track in Netflix’s reboot of the series Queer Eye for the Straight 
Guy.193 This is because Netflix, in many cases, does not create the closed captions 
for its programming, but relies on the providers of the video programming it 
distributes to provide closed captions.194 Netflix publicly describes an antagonistic 
relationship with these providers and threatens rejection of videos submitted with 
inferior or problematic closed captions.195 
 
 
 188. Paul Ohm and I have categorized these questions in terms of the difference between 
“Platform/User” regulations that hold users responsible for content they place on a platform, 
and “Platform/Platform” regulations that regulate platforms directly. Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, 
Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1692 
(2016). 
 189. 47 C.F.R. § 79.103(a) (2018). 
 190. Id. § 79.4(a)(1)–(2), (b). 
 191. See id. § 79.1. 
 192. Landmark Precedent in NAD vs. Netflix, NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF (June 19, 2012), 
https://www.nad.org/2012/06/19/landmark-precedent-in-nad-vs-netflix/ [https://perma.cc 
/BGL3-V7MM]. 
 193. Ace Ratcliff, I Rely on Closed Captions to Enjoy a Show and I Don't Appreciate 
Netflix’s Way of Censoring Them, SELF (July 10, 2018), https://www.self.com/story/queer 
-eye-netflix-closed-captions [https://perma.cc/E66K-KPEE]. 
 194. Netflix Partner Help Ctr., Why Are Netflix’s Standards for Subtitles and Closed 
Captions So High?, NETFLIX, https://partnerhelp.netflixstudios.com/hc/en-us/articles 
/214969868-Why-are-Netflix-s-standards-for-Subtitles-and-Closed-Captions-so-high 
[https://perma.cc/4U3R-R3UU]. 
 195. See id. Netflix even raised as a defense in the underlying litigation with NAD that it 
could not add captions to many of the videos that it distributed out of fear that doing so would 
626 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:591 
 
Addressing the allocation of responsibility among even sophisticated commercial 
providers and distributors of video programming is not a new issue for disability law 
outside the realm of Title III. For example, the FCC has struggled for more than two 
decades to apportion responsibility for the provision and quality of captions between 
the providers and distributors of video programming. The FCC’s initial rules adopted 
in the late 1990s placed all responsibility for captioning on video distributors on the 
thinking that distributors would leverage their contractual relationships to force video 
providers to include high-quality closed captions.196 But in 2016, the FCC reassigned 
responsibility for some parts of its captioning regulations to the providers of video 
programming, concluding that relying on contractual relationships had been 
ineffective and frequently resulted in missing or poor-quality captions that were 
primarily the fault of video programming providers.197 
The sheer scale, economic configuration, and legal status of the largest Internet 
platforms, which are constructed to facilitate ordinary people sharing content at little 
or no cost, are almost certain to exacerbate these challenges for allocating 
responsibility. For example, Facebook, the leading social media platform, is used by 
more than two billion people each month,198 who collectively post almost two billion 
images to Facebook each day.199 More than a billion auctions are hosted on eBay at 
a given moment,200 and more than eighty million ads a month are posted to 
 
 
expose Netflix to liability for copyright infringement. Nat’l Ass’n for the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 
869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D. Mass. 2012); see also BLAKE E. REID, THIRD PARTY CAPTIONING 
AND COPYRIGHT (2014) (discussing the copyright dimensions of third-party captioning 
efforts). YouTube likewise requires video owners to opt in to use of its automatic captioning 
requirements, presumably over copyright concerns. See YouTube Help: Use Automatic 
Captioning, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6373554?hl=en [https:// 
perma.cc/PC42-DU5Y]. Amazon also cited copyright issues raised by the Authors Guild in 
the context of failures to make Kindle e-book readers accessible in a dispute with the National 
Federation of the Blind. See generally Daniel B. Frye, Fighting for the Right to Read: A 
Campaign to Preserve Unlimited Access to the Text-to-Speech Feature of the Kindle 2, 
BRAILLE MONITOR (June 2009), https://nfb.org/sites/www.nfb.org/files/images/nfb/publica 
tions/bm/bm09/bm0906/bm090603.htm [https://perma.cc/TWC4-BTD2].  
 196. Closed Captioning & Video Description of Video Programming, Report and Order, 
13 FCC Rcd. 3272, 3286 (1997) (“Although we are placing the ultimate responsibility [for 
closed captioning] on program distributors, we expect that distributors will incorporate closed 
captioning requirements into their contracts with producers and owners, and that parties will 
negotiate for an efficient allocation of captioning responsibilities.”). 
 197. Closed Captioning of Video Programming, Second Report and Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 
1469, 1480 (2016) (“[T]he responsibilities imposed by the contractual arrangements between 
[video distributors, producers, and owners] will not be as effective or efficient as direct 
responsibility on the part of video programmers to achieve compliance with the Commission's 
new closed captioning quality obligations.”). 
 198. Third Quarter 2018 Results Conference Call Between Facebook Executives, 
Facebook, Inc. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials 
/2018/Q3/Q318-earnings-call-transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LS9-FVW7].  
 199. Shaomei Wu, Jeffrey Wieland, Omid Farivar, & Julie Schiller, Automatic Alt-text: 
Computer-Generated Image Descriptions for Blind Users on a Social Network Service (2017), 
in CSCW ’17 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED 
COOPERATIVE WORK AND SOCIAL COMPUTING 1180 (2011). 
 200. Who We Are, EBAY.COM, https://www.ebayinc.com/our-company/who-we-are/ 
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Craigslist.201 Users of YouTube, the leading video platform, now upload more than 
four hundred hours of video every minute.202 Wikipedia’s volunteer editors have 
posted more than 5.9 million articles, including multiple terabytes of images, video, 
and other media.203  
As a result, disability law must grapple with how to allocate responsibility for 
accessibility between platforms and their users. The aforementioned principles of 
layer integrity and layer crossing minimization suggest targeting regulations at the 
layer of the stack where problems occur.204 These principles suggest that, at a 
minimum, disability law should intervene at the application layer to require platforms 
to make their interfaces accessible and to require the provision of authoring tools to 
enable users to make their content accessible.  
Some of these problems are solved in principle by the FCC’s video player 
regulations,205 which require televisions, computers, laptops, set-top boxes, tablets, 
smartphones, and other devices to display closed captions206 and play back audio 
description and accessible emergency information.207 Others are similarly addressed 




 201. Factsheet, CRAIGSLIST.COM, https://web.archive.org/web/20160101050442/http 
://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (taken down as of Jan. 2, 2016, but available as of 
January 1, 2016).  
 202. Bree Brouwer, YouTube Now Gets Over 400 Hours of Content Uploaded Every 
Minute, TUBEFILTER (July 26, 2015), https://www.tubefilter.com/2015/07/26/youtube-400 
-hours-content-every-minute/ [https://perma.cc/843Z-8FU5] (quoting YouTube CEO Susan 
Wojcicki). 
 203. Wikipedia:Data Download, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia 
:Database_download [https://perma.cc/A656-EX2J]. 
 204. See supra Section II.B. 
 205. 47 C.F.R. pt. 79, subpt. B (2018). See generally Accessible Emergency Information 
& Apparatus Requirements for Emergency Information & Video Description, Report and 
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 28 FCC Rcd. 4871 (2013), updated by 
Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 FCC Rcd. 
5186 (2015) (describing in detail the FCC’s apparatus requirements for video (audio) 
description and accessible emergency information); Accessibility of User Interfaces & Video 
Programming Guides & Menus, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 28 FCC Rcd. 17,330 (2013), updated by Second Report and Order, Order on 
Reconsideration, and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 FCC Rcd. 13,914 
(2015) (describing in detail accessibility requirements for user interfaces for video playback 
apparatus); Closed-Captioning of Internet Protocol-Delivered Video Programming, 27 FCC 
Rcd. 787, 838–59 (2012) (describing in detail the FCC’s apparatus requirements for closed 
captioning). 
 206. 47 C.F.R. §§ 79.101–103 (2018). 
 207. Id. §§ 79.105–79.106. 
 208. Id. pt. 14 (2018). See generally Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
26 FCC Rcd. 14,557 (2011) (describing in detail the commission’s ACS rules). 
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Voice over IP (VoIP), text messaging, and video conferencing209 services210 and 
equipment211 to be accessible.212 Others might be solved by interpreting the ADA to 
apply WCAG or similar standards to the interfaces of the applications and Authoring 
Tool Accessibility Guidelines (ATAG) or similar standards to the authoring and 
hosting mechanisms provided by platforms.213 
But what, then, about the accessibility of content itself—for example, the 
provision of closed captions and audio descriptions for video, alternate text tags for 
images, transcripts for audio files such as podcasts, and plain-language versions of 
textual articles? Layer integrity and crossing minimization would suggest that these 
are problems that manifest at the content layer, and thus should be solved there by 
requiring platform users to make their content accessible to people with disabilities. 
This insight is also supported by the prospect that platforms will invoke Section 
230 of the Communications Act, which exempts platforms from being treated as the 
publisher or speaker of content they host for the purpose of defamation and other 
laws,214 as a defense against Title III claims that would make them responsible for 
the accessibility of content posted by their users, although Congress and Internet-law 
scholars have increasingly begun to debate the extent to which Section 230 should 
serve as a shield for platforms facilitating discrimination through the hosting of 
content.215 The Department of Justice has also unhelpfully set regulations that excuse 
public accommodations from “alter[ing] [their] inventory to include accessible or 
special goods,” including “Brailled versions of books, books on audio cassettes, [or] 
 
 
 209. 47 U.S.C. § 153(1) (2012) (defining “advanced communications services” to include 
interconnected and non-interconnected VoIP, electronic messaging, and interoperable video 
conferencing services); 47 C.F.R. § 14.10(c) (2018) (same). 
 210. 47 C.F.R. § 14.21(a)(2) (2018) (requiring accessibility and usability for services). 
 211. Id. § 14.20(a)(1) (requiring accessibility and usability for equipment). 
 212. Id. § 14.21(b) (defining accessibility in terms of accessibility for people with various 
types of disabilities); see id. § 14.21(c) (defining usability). Where accessibility or usability is 
not achievable, vendors can alternatively provide compatibility with users’ devices, including 
TTYs, through a “bring your own device”-style provision. Id. § 14.20(a)(3) (allowing 
compatibility where accessibility or usability is not achievable); see also id. at § 14.21(d) 
(defining compatibility). In 2016, the FCC updated the TTY compatibility rules to allow 
vendors to substitute for TTY the use of Real-Time Text (RTT) technology. Id. at § 
14.21(d)(5). See generally Transition from TTY to Real-Time Text Technology, Report and 
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 31 FCC Rcd. 13568 (2016). 
 213. The DOJ’s withdrawn Title III website rulemaking, Accessibility of Web Information 
and Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 43,460 (July 26, 2010), did not address WTAG. See supra Part I & notes 55–57. Some 
platforms have begun to address the provision of authoring tools for accessible content more 
robustly, but problems persist. See ANTKERS ET AL., supra note 160. 
 214. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
 215. Though a full treatment of the Section 230 literature is beyond the scope of this article, 
one exemplary criticism of Section 230 comes from Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin 
Wittes, who argue that the goal of Section 230 “was not to give [private actors] immunity from 
liability for helping third parties abuse each other.” Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, 
The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. TECH. L. REV. 453, 
456–57 (2018). 
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closed-captioned video tapes,”216 though courts have alternatively accepted and 
rejected the application of this regulation in the context of technology accessibility 
cases.217 
However, Title III contains a barrier to mandating accessibility at the content layer 
itself. The undue burden limitation relieves places of public accommodation from 
accessibility mandates where compliance would result in an undue economic 
burden.218 Parallel to the fundamental alteration doctrine, undue burden is rooted in 
the notion that disability law should not achieve equal access to a public 
accommodation by forcing it out of existence and therefore leaving people with and 
without disabilities equally unable to access it.219 
Undue burden features prominently in content accessibility primarily because 
adding accessibility features to content, including closed captions, video 
descriptions, text tags, and transcripts, can be nontrivially expensive relative to the 
cost of using a platform, access to which is often provided at no cost.220 While some 
platform users are sophisticated commercial entities who can easily afford to make 
their content accessible—and in some cases are required to do so under FCC 
regulations221—many are ordinary people uploading pictures and videos of pets and 
children, selling household items, and writing articles and posting media about areas 
of personal interest—all relatively frictionless and effectively transactions on 
modern platforms. Though the issue has not been litigated in the context of Title III, 
some platform users may argue that the imposition of a requirement that they caption 
or describe a personal video at some cost, which they would otherwise upload at no 
cost, would impose an undue burden.222 
 
 
 216. 28 C.F.R. § 36.307(a), (c) (2018). 
 217. Compare Report and Recommendation Regarding Defendants’ Motion to Stay or 
Dismiss, No. 3:15-cv-30023-MGM, 2016 WL 3561622, at *11 (D. Mass. Feb. 9, 2016) 
(rejecting in a case under Title III of the ADA Harvard University’s invocation of Rule 
36.307(a) and (c) as an excuse for leaving inaccessible content on its website), with Order 
Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, No. SACV 13-1387-DOC (RNBx), 2014 WL 
1920751, at *10 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (rejecting the application of Title III to Redbox’s 
streaming and physical video services by reference in part to Rule 36.307(a)), and Court Order, 
No. CV 09-7710 PA (FFMx), 2010 WL 8022226, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (citing Rule 
36.307(a) as an alternate basis for denying a Title III claim against Sony over the production 
of inaccessible video games). 
 218. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 219. See Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating “Undue Hardship” Claims 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1, 9, 15–18 (1990). 
 220. See Elisa Edelberg, How Much Does Audio Description Cost?, 3PLAYMEDIA (June 3, 
2019), https://www.3playmedia.com/2017/04/14/how-much-does-audio-description-cost/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y3RQ-UPM3]; Sofia Enamorado, How Much Does a Closed Caption 
Service Cost? (and Why Price Isn’t Everything), 3PLAYMEDIA (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.3playmedia.com/2019/02/08/how-much-does-closed-captioning-service-cost/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ZT6-CRVT]; Saul Hansell, Should YouTube Charge a Fee to Upload 
Video?, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (July 16, 2009, 12:43 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009 
/07/16/should-youtube-charge-a-fee-to-upload-video/ [https://perma.cc/Y8AQ-8F6S].  
 221. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 79.4(b) (2018). 
 222. The FCC has dealt for more than two decades with a significant proliferation of undue 
burden waiver petitions filed by producers of broadcast television programming. E.g., Anglers 
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The question returns, then, to whether platforms might be compelled to make the 
content they host accessible. The question of undue burden aside,223 automation may 
provide a solution.224 Platforms and academic researchers are developing advanced 
algorithms to automatically generate captions for videos,225 alternate text 
descriptions for pictures,226 and even preliminary audio descriptions for video227 and 
dynamically generated plain-language versions of websites accessible to people with 
intellectual and cognitive disabilities,228 though significant quality problems persist 
with many of these techniques.229 Relatedly, significant advances in recognizing both 
statutory exceptions and limitations in copyright law230 and recognition by the 
 
 
for Christ Ministries, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, Order, and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 14,941 (2011).  
 223. On the flip side, the dynamic of at-scale accessibility raises the prospects of positive 
externalities, such as the use of closed captions for search engine optimization and ad 
targeting. While the familiar examples of closed captions in loud bars and quiet hospitals are 
widely known, the battle to capture the value of positive externalities of accessibility features 
is often contentious. See, e.g., Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 173–
74, 181 (2d Cir. 2018) (concluding that a media-monitoring service that indexed and enabled 
search of television clips at scale using closed-captioned text copied from broadcasts 
constituted copyright infringement). 
 224. In proposing this solution, I acknowledge that I risk violating “Felten’s Third Law”: 
“Given a difficult technology policy problem, lawyers will tend to seek technology solutions 
and technologists will tend to seek legal solutions,” rejecting “non-solutions in [their] own 
area[s]” in the hope that “there must be a solution lurking somewhere in the unexplored 
wilderness of the other area.” Ed Felten, A Free Internet, if We Can Keep It, FREEDOM TO 
TINKER (Jan. 28, 2010), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2010/01/28/free-Internet-if-we-can 
-keep-it/ [https://perma.cc/2YAQ-B2D3]. 
 225. See, e.g., YouTube Help: Use Automatic Captioning, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6373554?hl=en [https://perma.cc/Z7YD-GVHP]. 
 226. See Wu et al., supra note 199. 
 227. See S R Sreela & Sunam Mary Idicula, AIDGenS: An Automatic Image Description 
System Using Residual Neural Network, in 2018 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA 
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING (ICDSE) (2018), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document 
/8527798 [https://perma.cc/D9PY-RY5M].  
 228. See generally CLAYTON LEWIS, IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN MACHINE 
LEARNING FOR PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES (2018), https://www.colemaninstitute 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/white-paper-coleman-version-1.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/Y768-X7DH]. 
 229. For example, YouTube notes that “automatic captions might misrepresent the spoken 
content due to mispronunciations, accents, dialects, or background noise” and instructs users 
to “always review automatic captions and [manually] edit any parts that haven’t been properly 
transcribed.” See YouTube Help: Use Automatic Captioning, GOOGLE, https://support.google. 
com/youtube/answer/6373554?hl=en [https://perma.cc/ST4J-NKZ7]. 
 230. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 121–121A (2012 & Supp. 2019) (the Chafee Amendment to the 
Copyright Act, providing for the remediation of texts for people with print disabilities, 
amended to be consistent with the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works 
for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled).  
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courts231 and the U.S. Copyright Office232 of wide latitude to make copyrighted 
works accessible consistent with the doctrine of fair use have helped remove 
copyright barriers to third-party accessibility efforts,233 though questions remain 
about the extent to which third parties might be held responsible under the ADA or 
other disability laws for the creation of poor-quality remediation.234 
While it is unclear how advances in automatic content accessibility technology 
ultimately will evolve to address this problem, it is worth considering economic 
interventions to incentivize the development of tools and services that will enable 
making large quantities of content accessible. One example is found in Title IV of 
the ADA, whose provisions are codified in the telecommunications section of the 
U.S. Code.235 Title IV subsidizes third parties who provide relay services, which 
generally involve situating a human or automated communications assistant in the 
middle of a phone call to interpret between a nondisabled phone caller and another 
caller using sign language via video, provide captions, type out text communications, 
or one of several other variants.236 Most importantly, the costs of providing the 
services are recovered from users of telephone services via their phone carriers and 
administered by the FCC.237 
The important insight from Title IV is that it facilitates the accessibility of an 
application—voice communication—by subsidizing the creation of accessible 
content (signed, captioned, and other adapted versions of one caller’s voice) that 
neither the content creator (the nondisabled caller) nor the application provider (the 
phone company) could ostensibly afford. It does so by requiring application 
providers to bake into the price of their service the cost of making it accessible, 
thereby spreading the cost among all users of an application. It also vests the FCC 
with the authority to structure the administration of the program to incentivize 
innovation that improves quality and drives costs down.238 
 
 
 231. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing 
copying made in service of the Americans with Disabilities Act as a fair use). 
 232. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: SEVENTH TRIENNIAL PROCEEDING 
TO DETERMINE EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION 95–101 (2018), 
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/2018_Section_1201_Acting_Registers_Recommendat
ion.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EAV-Q6C4].  
 233. See generally REID, supra note 195 (describing the post-HathiTrust viability of third-
party captioning efforts in the United States). 
 234. These questions of quality circle back to the threshold questions of whether platforms 
can be treated as “places” under Title III of the ADA and whether the DOJ’s regulatory 
authority and the administration of ADA judgments and settlements by federal judges is 
sufficiently nuanced and granular to carefully consider issues around quality. See supra Part 
II. 
 235. 47 U.S.C. § 225(a)(3), (b)(1)–(2) (2012). See generally KAREN PELTZ STRAUSS, A 
NEW CIVIL RIGHT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUALITY FOR DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING 
AMERICANS 90–144 (2006) (detailing the early history of the relay system). 
 236. See Relay Services, FCC (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/general/relay-services 
[https://perma.cc/4ZMT-TDMF]. 
 237. See 47 U.S.C. § 225(d)(3)(B). 
 238. Id. § 225(d); cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy 
Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 544 (2019) (discussing various innovation policy tools). 
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It is not clear whether such a model, or similar models such as the direct 
government funding of captioning239 or remediation of inaccessible books,240 would 
be workable for today’s dominant Internet platforms, many of which provide services 
at no direct cost to users and instead derive revenue through the provision of 
advertisements targeted using the data of their users.241 But these sorts of economic 
tweaks are one area of promise for unraveling the Gordian knot of allocating 
responsibility between the application and content layers of today’s platform-
dominated Internet ecosystem. 
D. ISPs: Internet Access and Accessibility at the Physical and Network Layers 
Disentangling the application and content layers of the Internet makes clear the 
need to consider the role of entities at all the layers of the Internet. And a user cannot 
access any application or content without connecting to the Internet via an Internet 
service provider (ISP).242 ISPs intermediate access to all Internet-enabled 
applications through their control over the implementation of protocols at the 
network layer and their provision at the physical layer of the wired and wireless 
infrastructure that facilitates the literal connection of users to the Internet. 
This Section explores the accessibility dimensions of ISPs’ gatekeeping role over 
access to the Internet. Recalling the admittedly imperfect metaphor of the Internet as 
the “information superhighway,”243 it is worth briefly conceptualizing the physical 
and network layers as the roads and sidewalks of cyberspace—the connective tissue 
between places of public accommodation. In the real world, this issue is often the 
province of federal, state, and local governments that are governed not by Title III, 
but by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1976, which requires federal 
programs to be accessible,244 by Title II of the ADA, which requires the same for 
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Human Services (HHS)). 
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[https://perma.cc/B2N4-TZPU]. 
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Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 79 (2015). 
 242. Compare Areheart & Stein, supra note 8, at 452 n.20 (“[W]ithout [website 
accessibility], knowing about the Internet’s opportunities and signing up with an Internet 
service provider would be relatively meaningless.”), with Lipton, supra note 74, at 1343 (“No 
one can interact online without contracting with an ISP.”). See also Ekstrand, supra note 64, 
at 430 (acknowledging despite a focus on website accessibility that “the question of broadband 
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state and local government programs and services,245 and by other federal laws.246 
But the provision of Internet access service is largely the province of private 
companies that, except in scenarios involving state or municipally provided 
broadband, are not subject to Title II. Instead, the accessibility dimensions of ISPs 
are generally governed by telecommunications law.247 
Past is prologue in Internet policy, and telecommunications law’s treatment of the 
accessibility of networks long predates the Internet. Of course, many 
telecommunications networks—including radio, broadcast television, and cable and 
satellite television—have served as single-“application” mechanisms, in Internet-law 
terms, for the one-way distribution of content to people. And as the previous Section 
explained, the accessibility of those networks has primarily been facilitated by FCC 
regulations focused on remediating content—generally through the provision of 
captioning to make audiovisual and audio programming accessible to people who are 
deaf or hard of hearing and the provision of audio description to make video 
programming accessible to people who are blind or visually impaired—and requiring 
video playback devices to render accessibility features.248 
But even within these integrated-networks-as-video-applications, issues of 
network protocol have played an important role in facilitating accessibility for people 
with disabilities. For example, television networks have long opposed the inclusion 
of open captions—captions “burned in” and enabled for all viewers, which cannot be 
turned off—on the grounds that hearing viewers would find them distracting.249 As 
a result, accessibility advocates and technologists facilitated the development of 
closed captions—which could be turned on or off by individual viewers—by 
developing standards for steganographically encoding captions into the invisible 
twenty-first scan line (“Line 21”) of broadcast signals, which is transmitted but not 
displayed on most TVs, thereby enabling the development of caption decoders to 
parse the invisible information and render it on-screen for viewers who are deaf or 
hard of hearing.250 
Nowhere has the role of network protocol accessibility been more critically 
important than in the network that preceded and effectively enabled the development 
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against people with disabilities by “public entit[ies]”). 
 246. Robin Malloy has written extensively on the intersection of disability law and 
accessibility considerations with land use and zoning law. See MALLOY, supra note 122; Robin 
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note 188; cf. Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy, 82 OR. L. REV. 
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of the commercial Internet251—the telephone network. Of course, the telephone 
network, like one-way video distribution networks, was initially an integrated 
network designed to facilitate a single application—bidirectional voice 
communication.252 
The accessibility problems introduced by bidirectional voice communications are 
obvious in hindsight: an application that relies on both speech and hearing, without 
more, was certain to exclude people with speech and hearing disabilities. Karen Peltz 
Strauss has noted the cruel irony of the discriminatory nature of the telephone 
network, which grew out of the text-based telegraph system that Alexander Graham 
Bell had created specifically to help his deaf students, wife, and mother.253 It took 
deaf and hard of hearing advocates and technologists more than ninety years after 
Bell’s invention of the telephone network to begin the successful proliferation of the 
teletypewriter (TTY), which facilitates real-time, text-based communications by 
transmitting typed letters via audio tones over the phone line, that restored the access 
for deaf and hard of hearing people in the transition from the telegraph to the 
telephone.254 
Though the full history of the accessibility of the telephone-network-as-voice-
communication-application is beyond the scope of this article,255 it is worth 
emphasizing that even the introduction of TTYs required overcoming discrimination 
against people with disabilities by AT&T, the proprietor of the phone network. 
Unlike the omissive failures described above,256 the discrimination against TTY 
users was overt—AT&T leveraged its dominant control over the phone system to 
deny its customers the ability to attach third-party devices, including TTYs, to the 
telephone network as illegal “foreign attachments.”257 
A critical step in making the phone network accessible was the FCC’s Carterfone 
order, which concluded that excluding third-party devices from the network was a 
violation of the prohibition on “unreasonable discrimination” in the Communications 
Act of 1934.258 These important but underexplored antidiscrimination threads 
continued into the breakup of AT&T under antitrust law259 and were later addressed 
by Congress in the requirements of Section 255 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, which requires telecommunications services and equipment to be made 
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 254. See id. at 7–8. 
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accessible to people with disabilities.260 And as voice telephony transitioned to the 
Internet, the FCC extended Section 255 to VoIP applications.261 Congress eventually 
gave the FCC extensive authority to regulate the accessibility of VoIP services under 
the advanced communications services provisions of the Twenty-First Century 
Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (CVAA),262 and the FCC has 
begun to facilitate the transition from TTY services to next-generation real-time text 
(RTT) services.263 
The broader lesson from the evolution of the accessibility provisions governing 
telephony is that telecommunications law has long played an important role in 
overcoming discrimination against people with disabilities, since even before the 
introduction of the ADA. That is, telecommunications law rightfully should be 
considered a first-order disability law alongside the ADA, and its anti-discrimination 
provisions should be embraced and engaged by disability advocates and scholars. 
The important role of telecommunications law as disability law is more important 
as the prominence of the telephone network has given way to the Internet. This is no 
surprise, as the telephone network has transitioned from effectively serving only as 
a voice application to one of the key technological bases of the commercial Internet. 
The telephone network facilitated the rise of the commercial Internet by affording 
Internet access via dial-up Internet services, which featured modems that modulated 
digital IP-based communications into analog audio tones, transmitted them over the 
phone line, and reconverted them to digital signals for transmission over the 
Internet.264 It has continued to do so through the use of digital subscriber line (DSL) 
technology, which along with cable, satellite, cellular, and various other wired and 
wireless services, now connects hundreds of millions of Americans to the Internet.265 
Early in the rise of the commercial Internet, Internet-law scholars recognized that 
discrimination was a critical threat to the future of the Internet. In 2003’s Network 
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Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, Tim Wu called for “a direct scrutiny of 
broadband discrimination,” famously coining the term “net neutrality”—the notion, 
broadly speaking, that ISPs should not be able to leverage their positions as 
gatekeepers of “terminating access monopolies” against their users to discriminate 
against users’ access to the applications and content of their choice.266 Considerable 
scholarly, regulatory, and popular attention has been devoted to the Network 
Neutrality half of Wu’s title and its attendant implications for the economics and 
governance of—and innovation and free speech on—the Internet.267 
However, some scholars have taken up the important but less explored focus of 
Wu’s work: Broadband Discrimination—that is, the potential for noneconomic 
discrimination by ISPs and the possibility of antidiscrimination remedies.268 Olivier 
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Sylvain has conceptualized ISP discrimination along lines of race, ethnicity, and 
income in terms similar to those of disability scholars arguing for Internet 
accessibility, noting that the Internet “is the premier communications platform 
through which public life today is shaped” and that “[t]o be excluded from all of its 
affordances is either an act of defiance, ignorance, or the consequence of material 
misfortune and disadvantage.”269 
The potential for discrimination problems involving people with disabilities at the 
network and physical layers has come to bear in the context of debates over network 
neutrality. People with disabilities were unexpectedly thrust into the FCC’s approach 
to network neutrality in 2014 when Mother Jones reported that Verizon lobbyists 
were urging members of Congress to spike then-pending FCC net neutrality rules on 
the grounds that they would hurt people with disabilities.270 The vague argument 
insinuated that it was necessary to single out the Internet traffic of people with 
disabilities, creating special “fast lanes” for accessible communications, to ensure 
their ability to use the Internet on equal terms.271 In effect, Verizon had argued for 
addressing one type of discrimination—the alleged performance shortcomings of a 
neutral Internet for accessible applications—with another, isolating applications used 
by people with disabilities for special treatment. 
Verizon made the claims, however, without first consulting consumer 
organizations representing people with disabilities; the National Association of the 
Deaf (NAD), the National Federation of the Blind (NFB), and the American 
Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD) emphasized, on the record, that they 
had not been consulted.272 A coalition of disability organizations and researchers—
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which, in the interest of full disclosure, I represented at the FCC—quickly scrambled 
to investigate Verizon’s claims. 
The results of the coalition’s investigations, reported in filings to the FCC, 
revealed that the need for disability-specific treatment of applications was, at a 
minimum, considerably overstated, a conclusion noted in a widely shared article 
entitled Deaf Advocacy Groups to Verizon: Don’t Kill Net Neutrality on Our 
Behalf.273 The coalition argued that making Internet-based applications accessible “is 
possible on an open network and without the need for broadband providers to 
specifically identify traffic from accessibility applications and separate it out for 
special treatment.”274 The coalition noted that accessibility concerns could be 
addressed, along with similar concerns that would apply to broad classes of 
applications through the FCC’s allowance of non-discriminatory “reasonable 
network management” practices, and urged the Commission to reject using disability 
as a basis for allowing ISPs to discriminate among applications.275 
The coalition argued not only that disability-specific fast lanes are unnecessary to 
achieve Internet accessibility, but also that affording ISPs the ability to discriminate 
could result in placing applications that people with disabilities relied upon in a slow 
lane—or blocking them altogether.276 The coalition described how ISPs had blocked 
the use of video conferencing services, including Apple FaceTime and Google 
Hangouts, which are frequently relied upon by American Sign Language users to 
communicate with each other.277 The coalition noted that ISP blocking and 
prioritization that hindered video communication by signers often occurred in places 
of employment and places of public accommodation, such as coffee shops and 
airports, arguably in violation of the ADA.278 The coalition also noted the importance 
of nondiscrimination in the administration of Internet access plans, explaining that 
the data caps imposed on many plans, while sufficient for many users, hindered the 
ability for deaf and hard of hearing users to engage in basic communications over 
video while forcing them to pay extra for voice services that they could not use.279 
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In the landmark 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC ignored Verizon’s arguments 
and adopted bans on application-based blocking, throttling, and other rules,280 as well 
as specific transparency requirements aimed at ensuring that people with disabilities 
could evaluate the suitability of broadband plans for use with accessible 
applications.281 However, the rules were reopened following the election of Donald 
Trump and his appointment of Ajit Pai as the Chairman of the FCC. Chairman Pai, 
who dissented from the 2015 Order,282 immediately opened a rulemaking aimed at 
abolishing the rules.283 
Net neutrality opponents again raised the specter of disability-specific 
prioritization as a justification for abolishing the rules,284 but cited as evidence only 
a decade-old (and failed) experiment by the Welsh government to provide video 
calling to citizens with disabilities over prioritized connections.285 The coalition of 
disability advocates and researchers urged the FCC to maintain the anti-
discrimination rules, noting that there was no serious evidence of a need for 
disability-specific prioritization286 and that the rules had effectively curtailed the 
discriminatory blocking of applications, yielding a slew of new high-bandwidth 
video conferencing and personal navigation applications287 needed by people with 
disabilities.288 The coalition again raised alarm bells over the increasing use of data 
caps by ISPs, which hindered the increasing usage of high-bandwidth applications 
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by people with disabilities289 and emphasized the danger of ISPs building their own 
proprietary video conferencing and navigation systems, tying people with disabilities 
who relied on those applications to specific network providers and increasing the 
incentives for discrimination against competing applications.290 The FCC ignored 
these concerns, rescinding the blocking and throttling rules later in the 2017 
Restoring Internet Freedom Order.291  
A full exploration of the implications of network deployment and operation policy 
at the physical and network layers for accessibility is beyond the scope of this article, 
and this article leaves unexplored, for example, important issues of broadband 
deployment to people with disabilities292 and the impact of wireless spectrum policy 
on hearing aids.293 But the net neutrality saga serves to underscore that Internet 
accessibility will require addressing issues of discrimination at the network and 
physical layers. Telecommunications law will continue to be an important 
complement to the ADA in the tangle of disability laws that must ultimately be 
applied to achieve Internet accessibility. 
E. Accessible Devices and the Internet of Things 
Finally, making the constituent layers of the Internet accessible will not suffice to 
make the whole Internet accessible if the devices that people with disabilities use to 
connect to the Internet and interact with Internet-enabled applications are not 
themselves accessible. As James Grimmelmann and Paul Ohm have explained, the 
value of applying non-discrimination principles to the Internet itself can be 
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1051-1808766.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ24-HSFZ].  
 292. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 280, at 5826–27 (“Adoption of Internet 
access services by persons with disabilities can enable these individuals to achieve greater 
productivity, independence, and integration into society in a variety of ways.”); FCC, 
CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 23 (2010), https://transition.fcc.gov 
/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/88U4-Q5G6] 
(noting lower rates of broadband adoption “[a]mong people with disabilities, who face 
distinctive barriers to using broadband”); Elizabeth E. Lyle, A Giant Leap & A Big Deal: 
Delivering on the Promise of Equal Access to Broadband for People with Disabilities 15–18 
(FCC Omnibus Broadband Initiative, Working Paper No. 2, 2010) (articulating a strategy for 
increasing broadband adoption among people with disabilities). 
 293. E.g., Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible 
Mobile Handsets, 32 FCC Rcd. 9063, para. 42 (Oct. 26, 2017) (discussing standards for 
radiofrequency interference in the context of the FCC’s hearing-aid compatibility (HAC) 
rules). See generally STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 293–320 (describing the history of the HAC 
rules). 
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significantly constrained by the failure to apply those same principles to the devices 
that connect to the Internet.294 
The desire for accessible devices dates back to at least the early nineteenth 
century, when Pellegrino Turri invented a typing machine and carbon paper for 
Countess Carolina Fantoni da Fivizzano—his friend who was blind.295 Thomas 
Edison likewise invented the phonograph for the express purpose of making books 
accessible in aural form to blind people.296 But in the Internet age, the accessibility 
of personal devices is becoming increasingly important as the devices constituting 
the so-called “Internet of Things” (IoT)—i.e., devices that connect to the Internet—
proliferate at an increasing scale. The National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) has noted predictions that the number of Internet-connected 
devices in the United States will increase from 2.3 billion to 4.1 billion between 2015 
and 2020, “portend[ing] significant and in some cases revolutionary changes[] [and] 
offer[ing] the potential for industry, government, and individuals to reap benefits in 
terms of increased efficiency, safety, and convenience that were previously 
impossible.”297 
Though IoT devices have been described in terms of numerous and varying 
characteristics,298 the most salient category for the purpose of this article is the 
devices that people use to interact with applications on the Internet, which range from 
desktop and laptop computers to phones and tablets to digital televisions to devices 
in clothing, cars, airplanes, and household appliances.299 IoT devices enable a variety 
of input and output modalities, including speech and pressure-sensitive touchscreens 
and screen less devices that communicate with aural and/or tactile feedback. 
These input and output modalities create significant potential for accessibility 
problems. For example, virtual assistant applications, including Amazon’s Echo, 
Google’s Assistant, and Apple’s Siri, are embedded into so-called “smart speaker” 
devices that listen for verbal instructions and questions and respond with aural 
feedback.300 While these devices can be a significant boon for people who are blind 
 
 
 294. See Grimmelmann & Ohm, supra note, 107 at 926 (noting in the context of 
generativity and net neutrality that “[a] neutral network that connects only appliances isn't 
generative; an occasionally discriminatory network that connects PCs can be”). 
 295. See LAZAR ET AL., supra note 6, at 23. 
 296. See generally id. at 23–25. 
 297. THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE & DIGITAL ECONOMY 
LEADERSHIP TEAM, FOSTERING THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 3–4 (2017) 
[hereinafter IoT Green Paper] (citing VNI Complete Forecast Highlights Tool, CISCO (2016), 
http://www.cisco.com/c/m/en_us/solutions/service-provider/vni-forecast-highlights.html 
[https://perma.cc/M2RL-LKU7] (“Global” and “United States” selected)). 
 298. E.g., Ohm & Reid, supra note 188, at 1676–77 (describing the proliferation of 
microprocessors in IoT devices). The NTIA noted in the IoT Green Paper that “[t]here was no 
consensus among commenters on a formal definition of IoT, or even on whether a common 
definition would be useful.” See FOSTERING THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS, 
supra note 298, at 5. 
 299. See Mobile Accessibility at W3C, W3C, https://www.w3.org/WAI/standards 
-guidelines/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/T4F8-QRJ5] (cited with approval in Andrews v. Blick 
Art Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)). Accessibility dimensions of 
smart cities, smart homes, and autonomous vehicles may also prove important. 
 300. See Micah Singleton, Nearly a Quarter of US Households Own a Smart Speaker, 
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or visually impaired,301 they can remain effectively inaccessible to people with 
hearing or speech disabilities who are unable to use the devices’ input and output 
modalities.302 
Internet-law scholars have raised significant concerns about the potential for 
discrimination in IoT devices.303 But few scholars have addressed the potential for 
IoT devices to yield discrimination against people with disabilities,304 largely 
focusing instead on discrimination rooted in the widespread collection of personal 
data by IoT devices and the attendant privacy, security, and economic harms 
resulting from the use of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other 
technologies to exploit the data.305 That is, scholars have largely focused on the 
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Impaired, CNET (July 23, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-tap-to-alexa 
-accessibility-feature/ [https://perma.cc/WKM4-4868] (describing efforts to make smart 
speakers more accessible). 
 303. E.g., Peppet, supra note 119. 
 304. Cf. Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, 
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Margot E. Kaminski, Matthew Rueben, William D. Smart & Cindy M. Grimm, Averting Robot 
Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983 (2017); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the 
Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805 (2016); Steven I. Friedland, Of Clouds 
and Clocks: Police Location Tracking in the Digital Age, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 165 (2015); 
Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51 IDAHO 
L. REV. 639 (2015); Madden, supra note 305; Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What 
Will We Have Agreed To?, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 661 (2015); Irina D. Manta & David S. Olson, 
Hello Barbie: First They Will Monitor You, Then They Will Discriminate Against You. 
Perfectly., 67 ALA. L. REV. 135 (2015); Christina Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes on 
the Internet of Things, 50 GA. L. REV. 1121 (2016); Scott J. Shackelford, Anjanette Raymond, 
Danuvasin Charoen, Rakshana Balakrishnan, Prakhar Dixit, Julianna Gjonaj & Rachith Kavi, 
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extent to which IoT devices can indirectly result in discrimination, rather than the 
extent to which IoT devices can be inherently discriminatory by way of 
inaccessibility.306 
Moreover, the accessibility of these personal devices has not been significantly 
addressed under Title III. Title III has been applied where devices bear a significant 
connection to a physical place of public accommodation, such as the accessibility of 
an ATM at a bank or other business, a computer at an Internet café, a registration 
kiosk at a hotel, or a point-of-sale device at a retail store.307 Most recently, these types 
of cases have been brought against or contemplated in the context of so-called 
“sharing economy” companies such as Uber,308 Bird, and Lime309 that fail to make 
transportation services like cars and scooters accessible to people with disabilities.310 
Title III can also apply where a device is itself contemplated as an means of 
accessibility for an inaccessible place of public accommodation—in Title III’s 
terminology, an “auxiliary aid”—such as an assistive listening device, a closed 
caption decoder, a telephone handset amplifier, or a screen reader or magnification 
software used to make the services of a place of public accommodation accessible.311  
 
 
-ios-12-blind-and-low-vision-users [https://perma.cc/WL6Y-7N7A]. Likewise, security bugs 
can disable functionality relied upon by people with disabilities. E.g., Nicole Perlroth, Apple 
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Tomberg, Trenton Schulz, and Sebastian Kelle, Applying Universal Design Principles to 
Themes for Wearables, in UNIVERSAL ACCESS IN HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERATION 550, 554–55 
(2015).  
 307. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in 
Commercial Facilities, Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,236, 56,315 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified 
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also Areheart & Stein, supra note 8, at 451 (“The ADA has played a 
central role in compelling the accessibility of a host of software applications, cell phones, 
ATMs, and e-book reading devices.”). 
 308. E.g., Crawford v. Uber, No. 17-CV-02664-RS, 2018 WL 1116725, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 1, 2018) (allowing Title III claims to proceed against Uber’s Internet-enabled ride-
sharing service for failure to provide vehicles accessible to wheelchair users). 
 309. E.g., Montoya et al. v. Bird Rides Inc. et al., DISABILITY RIGHTS CAL. (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/cases/montoya-et-al-v-bird-rides-inc-et-al [https://perma. 
cc/Z8CV-SW9R] (alleging a violation of Title III stemming from the abandonment of electric 
scooters in public places that impedes the ability of people in wheelchairs to navigate 
sidewalks and other thoroughfares). See generally Cyrus Farivar, Bird, Lime Sued By 
Disability Rights Activists Who Claim Obstructed Sidewalks, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 22, 2019, 
7:36 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/01/e-scooter-startups-city-of-san-diego 
-sued-by-local-disabled-plaintiffs/ [https://perma.cc/RCH2-PVP4]. 
 310. Similar concerns have arisen in the context of room-sharing services such as Airbnb. 
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Finds, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/technology/airbnb 
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the question of . . . assistive devices is also important . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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But Title III has not been significantly or directly applied to the accessibility of 
personal devices purchased by consumers. Indeed, the Department of Justice has 
declared that “the ADA does not apply directly to the manufacture of products,” and 
that it “lacks the authority to issue design requirements for equipment designed 
exclusively for use in private homes.”312 And what, precisely, might be required to 
make devices accessible raises significant technical questions about the nature of 
accessible product design. 
Non-ADA legal regimes have, to some degree, compensated for Title III’s 
perceived inability to require device accessibility. Legal mandates for the 
accessibility of devices and software used for person-to-person communications date 
back to the pre-Internet Telecommunications for the Disabled Act of 1982, which 
mandated rudimentary accessibility for the telephone system, including 
compatibility between phones and hearing aids.313 In the Internet era, Section 255 of 
the Communications Act314 and the corresponding guidelines developed by the U.S. 
Access Board315 and the FCC316 directly mandated the accessibility of equipment 
used for telecommunications services, such as telephones, routers, switches, set-top 
boxes, and home networking equipment used to connect telephone and VoIP 
services.317 Likewise, Sections 102 and 104 of the CVAA318 and the corresponding 
regulations developed by the FCC extended Section 255 to new advanced 
communications services equipment used to facilitate electronic messaging, VoIP, 
and video conferencing services,319 as well as to web browsers built into mobile 
phones.320 
Likewise, non-ADA regimes have augmented Title III by requiring the 
accessibility of devices used to view video programming. These mandates date back 
to the Television Decoder Circuitry Act of 1990 (TDCA), which required televisions 
thirteen inches or larger to include closed-captioning decoders.321 The TDCA’s 
 
 
 312. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in 
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 313. To Amend the Communications Act of 1934 to Provide Reasonable Access to 
Telephone Service for Persons with Impaired Hearing and to Enable Telephone Companies to 
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(1983); see also STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 34–35. 
 314. 47 U.S.C. § 255(b) (2012); see also STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 345–84. 
 315. The Access Board is an independent agency of the U.S. government created in 1973 
to help oversee the development of standards for the Architectural Barriers Act, a predecessor 
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/board-history [https://perma.cc/NFX5-YPW5].  
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111-260, § 104, 124 Stat. 2751 (2010). 
 319. See supra Section III.C & nn.206–10 (detailing the ACS rules). 
 320. 47 U.S.C. § 619(a) (2012); 47 C.F.R. § 14.60(b) (2018) (extending the ACS 
equipment accessibility rules and certain compatibility rules to web browsers on mobile 
phones). See generally Implementation of Section 718 of the Communications Act of 1934, 
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provisions, updated by Sections 203 and 204 of the CVAA322 and elaborated upon in 
the FCC’s corresponding rules,323 now require video playback devices of all sorts, 
including Internet-enabled video devices, to enable closed captions and video 
descriptions and to have accessible user interfaces.324 
But the Section 255 guidelines, ACS rules, and video programming rules are not 
universally applicable and cover only limited classes of networking equipment, 
communications devices and software, certain web browsers, and video playback 
hardware and software, and do not fully cover a significant proportion of IoT devices 
with functionality that goes beyond these contours.325 While the FCC contemplated 
extending its Section 255 and ACS rules further in its 2015 Open Internet Order by 
applying Section 255 to ostensibly all equipment connected to the Internet,326 the 
2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order rescinded this broad application of Section 
255.327 The FCC has also routinely granted exemptions to its ACS and user interface 
rules for advanced communications services embedded in television sets and video 
players,328 video game systems,329 e-book readers,330 and cars.331 
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Somewhat more promising in their scope are the Access Board’s guidelines332 
implementing Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act.333 The guidelines contain 
relatively comprehensive accessibility guidelines that cover all “[i]nformation and 
[c]ommunication[s] [t]echnology (ICT),” including devices, broadly defined—and 
even software, applications, websites, and content.334 However, Section 508’s 
coverage is severely limited to ICT procured by federal government agencies,335 
meaning that it requires accessibility of devices only indirectly where vendors sell 
devices to the government.336 
In short, there exists no legal regime that comprehensively mandates accessibility 
for IoT devices. While industry and disability organization representatives on the 
FCC’s Disability Advisory Committee (of which I am a member) acknowledged the 
serious shortcomings of accessibility on IoT devices and recommended that the FCC 
conduct a sweeping study on IoT accessibility,337 little action has been taken toward 
this end, and it remains to be seen what legal regimes will develop to address IoT 
accessibility—a critical component of a comprehensive approach to Internet 
accessibility. 
CONCLUSION 
At this point, some readers may expect a Part IV that lays out a series of solutions 
for how to navigate the accessibility challenges across the layers of the Internet stack. 
But I hope that this article has established, if nothing else, that these challenges are 
dramatically broader and deeper than a single article might address. While this article 
has sketched a framework for addressing the sufficiency of existing legal rudiments 
at the content, application, network, and physical layers, among devices that connect 
to the Internet, concerted future research, advocacy, policymaking, and technological 
development will be needed to apply, extend, and augment these rudiments to ensure 
the civil and human rights of people with disabilities to access the Internet on equal 
terms. 
Disability scholars have already laid an important foundation for Internet 
accessibility, and Title III of the ADA, the disability provisions of 
telecommunications law, and other statutes and regulatory regimes provide helpful 
doctrinal bases for achieving it. But to fully understand what making the Internet 
accessible will entail, disability scholars and advocates will have to navigate the 
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puzzles of perspective that have confounded Internet-law scholars for the past two 
decades.  
Augmenting disability law’s traditional internal perspective with an external view 
reveals new angles and challenges hidden within the Internet’s layered architecture 
for accessibility. Considering disability law through the lens of perspectives also 
helps illuminate the important role that an internal perspective, like the one taken by 
disability scholars, can provide for illustrating the societal salience of the Internet 
and Internet-enabled technology for specific groups of people—and in turn, 
animating broad policy concerns that flow from their experience of the Internet—
while showing that the external perspective can be helpful for designing 
comprehensive and granular regulatory schemes. 
